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ABSTRACT

In this examination of the transformations that modernization has brought or is bringing to political, economic, and cultural systems, emphasis is given to the consequences of these transformations for human potential in the modern age. An introductory section defining "modernism" is followed by sections devoted to nationalism and democratization. Seen as characteristic of the modernization process, nationalism and democratization are held responsible not only for political changes, but also for changed conceptions of human potential. Attention is then given to specific types of political systems in existence today. Four fundamental political issues--order, liberty, equality, and affluence are analyzed and closely related to aspects of human potential. Because political systems in transitional countries face fundamentally different situations with regard to these political questions than political systems in developed countries, specific types of systems are identified according to their approach to these issues. Next, in an examination of the international political system, the paper provides a general analysis of how modernization has transformed the international system. Changes in the function of culture are then discussed and related to changes in the nature of thinking necessary for participation in modern societies. The final chapter offers a summary of the relationship between human potential and these transformations and analyzes the difficulties of going "beyond modernism." (LH)

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Politics, Economics, Culture and Human Potential

Tom Carothers

June 1980

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POLITICS, ECONOMICS, CULTURE AND HUMAN POTENTIAL

Tom Carothers

I. Introduction - Modernism

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relations between external realms such as politics, economics and culture on the one hand and the conceptual and in some sense internal realm of human potential on the other. Speaking most generally, the context of the analyses pursued in this paper is "modernity." Politics, economics and culture have existed perenially with man but we are concerned here with their current state of evolution, current in the sense of this historical era -- the modern age (19th and 20th centuries). Therefore, rather than seeking the relation between political systems and individual potential or the relation between culture and individual potential in some very general, philosophical or ahistorical sense we shall be concerned with modern political systems and individual potential, modern culture and individual potential, etc. Taken together, the various analyses presented form, in some sense, a general investigation of the individual in the modern age.

"Modernity" or "modernism" are notoriously vague and subsuming concepts. At the most basic level it is generally agreed that certain broad aspects of politics, economics and culture are constitutive of modernity. In politics, the fusing of the nation and the state, the spread of the nation as the primary form of political grouping and the entrenchment of the principle of national sovereignty most essentially characterize the system of politics in the modern age. In economics, modernity centers upon industrialization. All modern states are evaluated economically in terms of their course towards, in or through industrialization (states are either pre-industrial, industrializing or post-industrial). It is difficult with regard to culture to agree

upon any basic aspect or aspects which constitute a modern culture. Yet the notion of "modern culture" remains a well-used one. Safest to say perhaps that modern culture is founded upon the dissipation, destruction or at least far-reaching modification of pre-existing traditional cultures (that is, cultures as they existed in pre-modern societies).

Beyond this very basic level it is difficult to describe or define modernity or "modern man" more specifically. Many attempts at such models have been made; generally they suffer from one of two major flaws. The first flaw is all-inclusiveness. Models which preserve their universality by including huge lists of attributes of modernity or vague terms such as "progress," "rationality," "growth" provide little insight. The second flaw is the opposite, that of a too limited or commonly, Western biased, notion of modernity. For example, Inkles' and Smith's[1] gigantic empirical investigation of modernity developed and utilized a conception of modern man stressing individual attributes of independence, autonomy, free-thinking, etc. Even a glance at an unquestionably modern country such as Japan shows that such attributes are highly Western biased; "modern man" as he exists in Japan has a different profile altogether.

Rather than pursuing Esperanto-like taxonomies of what may be an untaxonomic phenomenon it may be useful to focus on one consistent feature of modernization: modernization always involves a transition or transformation. That is, to become modern every nation has to undergo or has undergone a transformation from something it was to something it has not been before. In a relativist view such as this, the primary characteristics of pre- and post-modern states is not some set of particular features but the fact that these states view themselves or are viewed as "pre-" and "post-."

Nettl and Robertson[2] have formulated such an argument:

> "Modernization is the process whereby national elites seek successfully to reduce their amitic status and move towards equivalence with other well-placed nations. The goal of equivalence is not a fixed but a moving target and the perception of it will depend on the values of the nation. The international system is a place where everybody's values and objectives are formulated in relation to somebody else's."

This is essentially the same argument as that made by Zeylstra that underdevelopment is a concept that exists only by reference to countries which are considered to be developed.

In considering the basic minimum prerequisites for modernization, a relativistic view emphasizes not certain economic or technological resources but instead aspects related to the country's perception of itself and will to act. Nettl and Robertson propose the following three conditions as prerequisites of modernization[3]:

1) there must be a politically based openness to other national societies
2) behind that must be a fairly high degree of social mobilization
3) along with a minimal pervasive sense of participation in an international complex of societies.

In short, given the view that the primary characteristic of modernization is its transformational nature, a country seeking to modernize must be mobilized to transform itself.

With this view of modernization in mind, the modern world can be described as follows: A wave of transformation originated in Europe 200 years ago and has spread outward. This spread has not occurred evenly, and it is still in motion. Some nations are past the wave, some are in it and some anticipate it.

Ernest Gellner, who has articulated the view set forward in the above paragraph[4], utilizes the dichotomy of developed (or industrialized) vs. transitional societies in discussing the modern age. His use of the term "transitional" to describe non-modernized countries is consistent with his

view that the primary characteristic of modernization is that it involves a transformation. Countries which are in the process of developing are, most fundamentally, countries in a state of transition from something they were to something they have not been. A transitional society, he says, is one in which legitimacy (of the government or of the social order) is based on the promise of a future achievement, where this achievement requires a very radical transformation but one to be attained in this world by this-worldly means.

It is crucial, Gellner argues, that we view modernization as a transforming or metamorphosizing process because there are certain attributes or results of metamorphoses in general which are thereby characteristic of our age. Drawing upon Kafka's Metamorphosis, Gellner remarks that a metamorphosis creates problems; when metamorphosized one cannot draw upon the resources (the convictions, forms of life, traditions, etc.) of either the new or old state. The general consequences of a metamorphosis are a disorientation and bewilderment, a sense of chaos and contradiction, an attempt to restore some kind of order and direction.

In the world today then, there exist countries which have transformed and countries in transition. The former seek to understand what they have become, to gain control of the forces that they have created and that they embody. They hope that the transformation that they have accomplished will, in fact, lead to some stability and social harmony and that order and direction can be found and maintained. The latter struggle in their transition and seek to complete their transformation. Their "target" is indeed a moving one and the very process in which they are engaged evolves as nations from every part of the world immerse the immense heterogeneity of their pasts into this projected vision.

In this paper we will examine the transformations that modernization has brought or is bringing to the "external" systems (political, economic, cultural) that constrain, guide and promote human potential. Emphasis will be given to the consequences of these transformations for human potential in the modern age.

First, nationalism and democratization will be considered. Both of these movements are characteristic of, and in some ways essential to, the modernization process. Nationalism has revolutionized the organization of political units in the world. Democratization has transformed the political processes which underlie many political units and has come to serve as an ideal in much of the world. As will be seen, both nationalism and democratization involve not just political changes but changed conceptions of human potential as well.

Attention will then be given to the specific types of political systems in existence today. Analysis will center upon four fundamental political issues - order, liberty, equality and affluence. Each of these issues is closely related to certain aspects or components of human potential. It will be shown that political systems in transitional countries face a fundamentally different situation with regard to these political questions than political systems in developed countries. Within each of these two general groups (transitional and developed) specific types of systems will be identified and explicated by their approach to these fundamental issues.

Following this, the international political system will be examined. First a general analysis of how modernization has transformed the international system will be presented. Then the relation between individual and group interest and the nature of group to group morality will be considered. The notion of a world community or, more broadly, the prospects for evolution

of the present international system will be critically discussed with a special emphasis on the failings that the present system harbors for the individual.

The nature of culture and the greatly altered function of culture brought on by modernization will be analyzed in the sixth chapter. The relation of culture to other external systems in modern societies will be considered and it will be argued that culture can be understood as a mediating system between the internal realm of individual psychology and the external structures (political, economic, social) in a society. Changes in the function of culture will be related to changes in the nature of thinking necessary for participation in modern societies.

In the final chapter a summary of the relations between human potential and these transformations in the political, economic and cultural realms will be presented. In conclusion the question of "what lies beyond modernism?" will be asked and some analysis of the difficulties in going beyond modernism be set forth.

II. Nationalism

In the modern world individuals are, as a matter of rule, members of nation-states. The nation-state is a relatively new form of political organization. It arose in the 18th century, spread through Europe in the 19th century and spread through the world in the 20th century. It has replaced tribes, fiefdoms, city-states, empires, etc. In a nation-state, political loyalty or attachment is felt to be owed to the nation. The boundaries of a nation-state are considered to be determined by the boundaries of the nation. The "nation" in its pure linguistic sense refers to a distinct ethnic or cultural group that is "primordial" in the same sense that a group such as family or tribe is. The Romans, the Jews, Greeks and the assemblage of German tribes each had a "natio," that is as a distinct ethnic or cultural group.

Prior to the rise of nationalism, states - the governing or ruling entity in a political organization - and nations were not necessarily linked. The most important states were empires and dynastic organizations whose boundaries were defined by royal marriages, alliances, ancient land titles and wars. The rise of nationalism led to the fusion of nations and states. The basic tenet of nationalism is that the nation precedes and creates the state.

(In common parlance we use "nation" to refer to "nation-state." From now on in the paper the word nation will be used in this way.)

To understand "the situation of the individual in the modern world" it is necessary to investigate his most basic context or status - that of being a member of a nation. In this section such an investigation of nationalism will be presented. Two questions are considered: 1) What are the causes of nationalism? and 2) What is the nature of individual membership in a nation, that is, on what is membership based, what is the nature of the membership bond?

Two theories of nationalism will be discussed. The first, that of Gellner's[1], contends that nationalism is the result of industrialism and the push for economic growth. The second, Kedourie's[2], explains the rise of nationalism in terms of the evolution and assertion of certain ideas and beliefs about the nature of man, the nature of freedom and the necessity of self-determination.

Nationalism, Gellner argues, is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it is a force that invents nations where they do not exist. It is the need or desire for growth, a prime characteristic of the modern age, that generates nationalism, not vice-versa. This nation-building force derives from the spread of industrialization. In Gellner's view, industrialization and modernization is an outward-moving wave which disrupts traditional political units and undermines the faiths and practices which sustain them. Cleavages of interest develop between sets of people hit at different times and different ways by this wave. One group of people may begin to transform, that is to modernize more quickly or in a different style than a neighboring group - this differentiation becomes in effect a "cleavage of interest." If differentiating marks are available (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, etc.) and cleavages of interest are powerful between them, different groups may begin to conceive of themselves as nations.

We can examine this process more specifically. Modern industrial society hinges upon an elaborate division of labor diversified over both time and space; that is, people not only do different things, the same people do different things at different times. This division of labor plus mobility requires that people be willing and able in terms of skills, mental equipment and general readiness to change jobs and place. This implies that the main agency of training in a modern society should not be a situation or location

specific agent such as the family but a generalized, standardized educational institution. Modern education must be "generic," Gellner says, specific job training is left to a later stage; what must first be provided is a shared basic education. While there is a continuity of content between education in traditional and modern societies there is not a continuity of function or of institutions. The primary purpose of schooling is no longer (as it was in pre-modern societies) to produce a privileged elite. Schooling is now a "universal condition of citizenship;" it provides a kind of minimum necessary for participation in an industrial society. This minimum may begin at literacy and go from there to other basic competencies. At root, it is the fact of schooling rather than the particular content that is of importance here.

The mobility inherent in the modern diversification and differentiation of labor tends to destroy, Gellner claims, the various intermediate kin units and traditional social units. As the society becomes more fluid, contract tends to replace status in the binding of a citizen to a role or job. That is, when labor is mobile and a basic education is common, status of individual workers is no longer so distinct as it tends to be in highly structured traditional villages or tribes. As modernization tends to place individuals in increasingly specific and contractual roles in society, the primary unspecialized, diffuse, multi-purpose relationship is that of the individual to the nuclear family which, Gellner argues, thereby acquires extraordinary importance and emotional significance.

Given that mobility is a key feature of an industrializing region, the important boundary becomes that which delimits the range within which this mobility is practicable. This boundary, Gellner says, tends to be determined by the differentiating marks between regions, that is to say, the linguistic,

ethnic, religious or cultural differences which exist between one region and the next. It is these which limit the mobility of the individuals in a region and thereby generate the limits of loyalty and the concepts in terms of which effective loyalty can be felt. It is these features (linguistic, cultural) which become incorporated into the educational system which endows the individual of the region with the basic capacities needed to participate in his newly industrializing society. In short, it is these features or differentiating marks which become the basis for national boundaries.

The result of this process of nation-building, according to Gellner, is a distinctive form of group loyalty in nations. Nationalism is not, he says, simply group loyalty writ large. It is, rather, a form of abstract loyalty which is the unique result of the push of industrialization. There are three essential characteristics to this distinctive form of group loyalty. Firstly, the loyalty invoking group is of a non-intimate, mass nature. In pre-industrial societies the primary group to which an individual belonged tended not to be a mass, non-intimate group. Secondly, the definition of membership in nations is by culture. As explicated above, the process of industrialization leads to cleavages between regions and boundaries tend to form along cultural divisions. In industrial societies, individuals are educated to at least some basic level; this education, its language, the history it teaches, the basic cultural underpinnings of the education becomes the common-denominator of citizenship in each country. In this way, culture serves as the social glue with which membership in a nation is given substance. Thirdly, membership in a nation is direct in the sense that it is not mediated by intervening subgroups (family, village, etc.). Oddly then, membership in a nation is both abstract and direct - abstract in the sense that the nation is not a tangible group in the same way a tribe is; yet membership is direct in that all citizens are members whether or not they

belong to any particular groups or subgroups in the nation (towns, organizations, political parties, etc.).

Kedourie explains nationalism in a markedly different fashion than Gellner. Kedourie argues that nationalism is an idea "invented in Europe 150 years ago." The rise of nationalism, in his account, is the result of an evolution and an assemblage of certain ideas. These ideas and their order of development are presented below.

At the heart of nationalism, Kedourie says, is a revolutionary principle of politics (brought by the French Revolution): the idea that governments must derive their sovereignty from the nation itself. This principle holds the will of the people primary saying that a nation is a body of people to whom a government is responsible through legislature; any body of people forming together and decided on a scheme for their government form a nation.

Following this is the idea of self-determination. Kant developed a new moral philosophy which held that man is free when he obeys the laws of morality that he finds within himself and not in the external world. The political implications of this philosophy were that an autonomous man was considered to be a good man and for him to realize his autonomy he must be free. Self-determination becomes the supreme political good.

This idea became attached to a new conception of the role of the state in the individual's life. Kant's and Fichte's epistemology subscribed to the general view that a whole is greater than, and prior to, all its parts. The freedom of the individual, which is his self-realization, thereby lies in identifying himself with the whole. The state is not just a collection of individuals, it is higher than the individual. The state should therefore be the creator of man's freedom, not in the external and material sense but in an internal and spiritual sense.

In addition, Kedourie points to the German and French belief in the 1800's in the excellence of diversity and of the separateness of cultures. The general belief, he says, was that every nation was a natural division of the human race. Even further, this line of thought held that individuals must cultivate their peculiarities; that only through each different species reaching the perfection of its kind can universal harmony be attained.

These underlying ideas - belief in a government being responsible to its people, the idea of self-determination, the conception of the state as the means to individual self-determination and belief in the excellence of diversity - culminate, Kedourie contends, in the fundamental principle of national self-determination. This is the belief that language, race, culture, and religion constitute different aspects of the same primordial entity, the nation. This principle, according to Kedourie, has evolved in the manner described, has come to be accepted, and now is entrenched in the modern world.

Like Gellner, Kedourie argues that nationalism is not a "new tribalism," that nationalism is a distinctive form of group belonging or membership. The essence of group membership in a nation, he says, is that it partakes in a "General Will," that a nation of common "legislative Reason" exists. He stresses an active conception of membership. He says that a tribesman is a member of a group by virtue of his birth; whereas membership in a nation occurs by virtue of self-determination.

Both Kedourie's and Gellner's theories can be criticized. Kedourie places a rare faith on the power of ideas; he does not clearly explain how these ideas actually set into motion the transforming sweep of nationalism. Additionally, it can be argued that his account is highly Western specific, it is not clear that all nationalist movements necessarily derive from this particular set of ideas. Gellner, by contrast, gives credence almost exclusively to economic forces underlying nationalism. It may be that he undervalues

the power of nationalism as a social force originating at times from social-political factors (e.g., anti-colonialism, etc.).

In any case, nationalism has revolutionized the political organization of the world and in so doing has transformed the situation of the individual with respect to the political units of which he is a member. Political units in the modern world, unlike political units of previous ages are considered to be expressions of the collective self-determination of their members. Individuals' will, banded into the "General Will," has become a primary political force. Implicit in this is an expanded conception of human potential. In the modern age individuals are credited with the right, the duty and the capability to determine their own political form - a greatly broadened reign is given to the potential of all a society's members.

III. Democratization

Nationalism has revolutionized the political organization of the world. A second force widespread in the modern world has revolutionized the actual conception of order and the workings of these new political units - democratization. Democracy has become an almost universally accepted norm or ideal. Nearly all governments claim to be representative of the people's will or choice and nearly all governments claim either that their political system is democratic, is in the process of becoming democratic or, at the very least, strives to become democratic but is blocked by other political elements. Both Western developed countries and the Eastern Communist countries claim to be democratic. Rightist leaders in Latin America and other areas (South Korea, Phillipines, Indonesia, etc.) claim to be seeking democracy. Similarly, post-colonial nations, particularly in Africa, proclaim that they too are seeking stability which will be conducive to or generative of democracy.

While the actual existence of democratic political systems in countries which claim to be democratic is disputable and the proclamations of "democratic intention" in clearly non-democratic states may simply be empty propaganda, the fact remains that democracy is the object of the claims. Whether it does exist in widespread form is questionable, but that democracy does serve at least as a professed ideal almost universally seems evident.

The fact that such disparate political systems as those in, for example, Canada and Czechoslovakia, both claim to be democratic compels us to consider more precisely what democracy is. The "classical theory of democracy," that is, the traditional Grecian ideal, centers on the idea that the will of the people is sovereign. Government is by consent. Emphasis is placed on both participation and consensus. Government is of, by, and for the people.

The dispute over "which countries are democracies in this sense?" is a complex one. Communist countries claim that the Western democracies are not of the people (that the leaders are only from a certain class of society), by the people (Western governments are charged with being concentrations of power from certain groups in society), nor for the people (they are charged with representing only certain class interests). And Western countries claim that in Communist countries government is not by consent and that no genuine participation in selection of leaders is allowed citizens.

While this dispute is without doubt an important one, for our purposes we are more concerned with the relation between this classical principle of democracy and human potential. The notion of government by consent, the belief that the will of the people is sovereign represents a sort of Copernican revolution in the conception of the individual. The essential idea of democracy - that individuals should exercise control over those who traditionally control them - embodies a vital expansion of the idea of human potential. Fundamental to democracy is the idea that individuals in a society have this potential as well as the right to guide their own destiny. With democracy then, comes what we will see to be the hallmark of the modern age - the belief in the all-expansive and all-inclusive potential of the individual.

The actual idea of democracy did not originate in the modern age; it has existed since at least the Golden Age of Athens. We must ask, therefore, why is it only now in the last two hundred years that democracy (with its attendent notions of human potential) has come to be widely accepted as a norm or ideal? Gellner[1] traces the spread or rise of democracy to changes in the basis of legitimation employed in societies. Societies, Gellner argues, are legitimated by either "In justifications" or "Out justifications." "In

justifications appeal to something accessible and tangible Inside the world. Out justifications appeal to something Outside, something transcendent. A growing secularization has prefaced and characterized the modern age, he says. An increasing diversity of transcendent beliefs as well as a decline of transcendent beliefs has made it necessary to justify political arrangements from Within rather than Without. Democratic theory and its appeal, Gellner says, are the consequences of this change. Populist formulation is consequence of the modern situation of rapid change, mobility, fluid identities (that is, basic shared culture as described in Gellner's theory of nationalism), and eroded previous belief.

Clearly this change from "Out" to "In" justification underlies both nationalism as well as democracy. The notions of collective will and self-determination, essential to nationalism, are the essence of a Within rather than a Without principle of political arrangements. Nationalism is the quest for a <u>form</u> (the nation) for these principles and democratization is the search for a <u>process</u> that will give reign to these principles within that form.

Out justifications, such as divine right or colonialism, have largely disappeared and been replaced by In justifications. The most basic tendency of an In justification is that it rests on the consent of the members of the society. It is this notion of "consent of the people" that is at the heart of the almost universal appeal of democracy. And it can be seen that even though the actual existence of democracy is not by any means universal, this notion of "consent of the people" does exist as a force almost everywhere. Let us consider several cases where political systems are not democratic yet where "consent of the people" can yet be documented.

A common Western view of the Communist Eastern bloc countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.) is that their governments exist in spite of the people's wishes. While I would agree that these political systems are not democratic,

I would argue that these governments depend at some level on some, perhaps quite minimal, consent of the people. For example, in 1970 the Polish leader was driven out of office by popular reaction to food price rises. While he had not been democratically elected he was nonetheless dependent on a certain consent of the people. When he trespassed across a certain tolerance that consent was withheld and he lost office.

A similar argument can be made regarding dictators who come to power through some exercise of force. Such leaders are not democratically chosen yet again they tend to be dependent on at least a very minimal consent of the people. Most dictators claim to be populist leaders; they seek populist legitimation. The Shah of Iran is an example of a leader who gradually lost even the most minimal consent of the people. Despite his sophisticated means of enforcing his hold on the political system of his country, when consent was withdrawn, when people refused to go on with their daily life and were willing to walk straight into rifle-firing security forces, the Shah left the country.

There are, in some cases, leaders who manage to maintain power even though they do not enjoy even the least consent of the people. Idi Amin was such a leader, Stroessner of Paraguay may be another. In such cases the repressive force of the leader is so extreme and the country operates in such a way that the lack of consent does not render the leader powerless. Normally in such cases, the country operates in a very disorganized and/or corrupt way so that daily life can go on without the consent of the people.

"Consent of the people," as I am using it here, underdetermines democracy. A government may have this consent but not be democratic although it may not be democratic without this consent. While democracy exists only in certain countries, this consent underlies almost all governments. Democracy, as discussed before, does exist as an ideal almost universally and this minimalist

notion of "consent of the people," in force almost universally, represents the kernel of this ideal.

Having considered the rise and spread of the idea and ideal of democracy, we can turn now to the question of the creation of democracy. Given that the idea and ideal exist, what leads to the creation and maintenance of actual democratic systems? Many, many models of "the basis for democracy" have been developed, particularly in the heydays of the post-colonial eras when new nations emerged right and left. In general, such models focus on the structures deemed to be necessary for democracy: educational structures, social structures, organizational authority-bearing structures, etc., etc. (see, for example, Shihls, 1970[2]). These models tend to fall into the same pitfalls that modernization models are caught in: over-inclusiveness, and/or Western bias. For our purposes it is more useful to focus on a more basic level of analysis and to consider what is perhaps the primary requirement for a democracy: the existence in the society of a consensus of fundamentals (values, goals).

Gellner[3] argues that a democratic society can only be acceptable when it respects certain limits, certain entrenched principles. These principles are prior to and limit the consent of the people. Consider, he suggests, the following dilemma: a democratic society votes to exterminate a minority group or section of the society. According to the notion of democracy, this is possible. How do we resolve such an unacceptable possibility with the notion of consent and will of the group? Gellner says that such a possibility (voting to exterminate a minority) violates certain entrenched principles inherent in all of the democratic states existing today. These principles are prior to, and thereby delimit consent and will of, the people.

In fact then, in Gellner's view a society expresses its will or consent

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at two levels: 1) the basic and tacit (but not total or rigid) consensus concerning the entrenched rules and principles, and; 2) a more superficial level at which greater disagreement is tolerable. A society cannot be based on will and consent alone; a basic consensus must exist. He points out that the entrenched principles and rules may be so much a part of the intellectual atmosphere that they are taken for granted in the society.

Such a fundamental consensus is by no means a guarantee of democracy; it is rather the most basic precondition. Conceivably it could be argued that this consensus is also a precondition of modernization in general. In order for a country to industrialize, it is likely that this basic consensus of values and goals must exist. Furthermore, for a country to be able to participate as a member of the modern international political and economic systems, some basic cohesiveness must exist in the country. What we are saying then is that a consensus on fundamentals throughout the society is the basis for a modern social order. Prior to the modern age, social order may have been based on other principles (depending on the type of group in question - tribe, fiefdom, city-state, etc.) but in this age of collective self-determination of nations a consensus is the basic nature of a workable social order.

This brings us to the particular problem of democracy in transitional societies. Transitional societies are in a process of transformation. Their basic structures, Gellner points out, are the objects of deliberation and choice, of will and consent. In other words, they have no pre-existing consensus applicable to a modern, industrial state. Whatever consensus they might have before beginning to modernize is itself thrown into flux by the process of transformation.

Without such a consensus, democracy will ultimately prove elusive. Furthermore, without such a consensus, even the minimal notion of "consent

of the people" will be a very weak force. Because of this, such countries are particularly susceptible to leaders who govern without consideration of other than personal interests; that is, susceptible to leaders who get away with ignoring completely the "consent of the people" (Idi Amin, possibly Stroessner, Pol Pot in the last two years of his regime).

The lack of a basic consensus in a society is particularly crucial for, as Gellner notes, the very idea of self-determination (for a nation-to-be) becomes problematic when the very self is in question. In Western countries democracy arose at a time when basic social order already had a certain historical basis. Without this order an attempt to establish a democracy runs into the problem of "who chooses the choosers?" And so Gellner concludes:

> "When there is a pre-existing social order democratic procedures are feasible and desirable; but where a social order is being brought into being democratic procedures may be difficult.... As a piece of social technology democracy looks more effective for making marginal decisions than for fundamental ones."[4]

In discussing modernism I emphasized that modernization can be most essentially characterized as a transformation. Societies which are modernizing are in the process of total transformation. Our world is populated with societies which have become modern and societies in the process of attempting to become modern.

Nationalism and democratization are primary features of the modern age, primary aspects of the transformation to modernism. Nationalism arises from the demands and the transforming forces inherent in industrialization. Nationalism embodies the idea of collective self-determination; a collection of individuals self-determine the political unit to which they will belong. Democratization provides the means by which this political unit is directed and by which it expresses the will of its members.

Taken together, nationalism and democratization represent a crucial transformation of the individual. The individual is exalted as the ruler

of his own destiny; individual will becomes the highest value. This transformed conception of the individual underlies modernization and the modern age. Inherent in modernism is therefore a vastly expanded notion of the potential of humans.

Societies which are in the process of modernizing are, therefore, in the process of transforming not just their economic and political structures but their very conception of the individual and his potential. Without the modern conception of the "exalted individual" a society cannot accomplish the economic and political changes needed to achieve modernization. While it is common to see that the potential of the individual tends to be less expansive and variegated in transitional societies, it is important to see that potential is constrained in these societies not simply because of economic or political conditions but, more fundamentally, because of a differing conception of the individual itself.

IV. Political Systems

Introduction

In this section of the paper the relation of modern political systems to human potential will be discussed. Clearly, the relation between politics and potential is not only complex and to some degree culture-specific, but diffuse and not easily delimited by rational analysis. With this in mind, the discussion will focus on four issues or concerns fundamental to modern political systems and fundamental to the "situation" or exercise of human potential in those systems: order, liberty, affluence and equality.

Classical Western political theory was born, Gellner contends[1], from a primary preoccupation with power and order. The establishment of political order is the most basic political issue in any society. By political order it is meant here some basic society-wide consensus on fundamental aspects, values and goals of the political system. To have a political order consensus must prevail with regard to questions such as: what basic type of political system should exist, how should this system function, what general role should the political system play in the society? Political order is thus not unlike social order in nature. Social order is based upon some consensus on fundamental aspects, values, and goals of the society itself. To have a social order consensus must prevail with regard to questions such as: what are the actual boundaries of the society (who is a member and who is not), what are the elements (linguistic, cultural, religious, ethnic) of commonality of importance to the society, what values are sacrosanct in the society, etc.?

While political order and social order are alike in their consensual nature, the domain of the former is greatly narrower and perhaps is a subset of the latter. Nations often have deep changes in political orders without parellel transformations in social orders. Since 1789, France has had five

Republics, each of which may be counted as a distinct political order while maintaining a single overall social order. Italy is an example of a country with a relatively stable social order and a highly unstable political order. While political order depends on the existence of some social order, the reverse does not hold.

The traditional primary conflict in the establishment of a political order is that between liberty and order. The increase of liberty tends to decrease order and vice versa. Gellner notes the three famous answers to this conflict[2]:

1) The attainment of order is primary to everything.
2) The attainment of order is very important but only if combined with liberty.
3) The right order is important but it must constitute a moral fulfillment - that is, order is derivative of the moral necessity of liberty.

In the developed world, however, Gellner argues, we have passed the "hump" of order. Modern political order has been established; it is part of the transformation which developed countries have completed. We have moved, he says, to a second "hump" - the achievement of industrial affluence. The "modern question," he believes, is affluence vs. liberty and one can replace "order" by "affluence" in the above three propositions in order to derive the various approaches taken to this conflict.

One could argue that in addition to affluence vs. liberty, other "humps" exist in nations which have crossed the initial hump of order. These other conflicts concern the issue of equality. Equality has arisen as a fundamental political issue in the modern world joining affluence and liberty as the basic "post-order" concerns. A conflict between liberty and equality exists. The reign of many liberties tends to allow substantive inequalities to develop and on the other hand the strict enforcement of substantive equality amongst individuals tends to necessitate the curtailment of certain liberties (such

as the freedom to maximize one's own rewards). And a conflict between affluence and equality exists. The unbridled pursuit of affluence tends to increase inequality while the strict regulation of equality tends to slow the achievement of affluence.

In developed countries then, liberty, affluence and equality are major issues and sources of conflict in their political system. Transitional societies by contrast face a much more basic dilemma with regard to their political systems. Transitional societies are in the process of traversing the first "hump;" they are in the midst of trying to establish a consensual political order that will be compatible with some substantial degree of liberty. That is, they are faced with the conflict of order vs. liberty. Yet they are also confronting the issue of affluence and the need to become industrialized. Thus they are having to cross two humps at once. Furthermore, the idea or ideal of equality has spread to such a great extent that in many transitional societies conflicts of equality vs. liberty, equality vs. affluence, and even equality vs. order are present. The dilemma of political systems in transitional societies then is that they are attempting to resolve the most basic modern political issue - that of a consensual political order - while <u>at the same time</u> having to confront the issues of liberty, equality and affluence. In effect, they are trying politically to learn to walk and run at the same time.

What makes this dilemma particularly troubling is that the two "humps," order vs. liberty and affluence vs. liberty are by nature successive. That is, order is a precondition for the achievement of affluence. A society cannot successfully industrialize unless some basic social and political order prevails. Unlike the developed countries which were able to negotiate the "humps" of order and of affluence <u>successively</u>, transitional societies in

our modern age face both demands simultaneously. Worse yet, governments in transitional societies often count on the achievement of affluence to establish political order; that is, they try to reverse the order of the two "humps."

That the issues of order, liberty, affluence and equality are closely bound to the question of human potential should be evident enough. What place an individual has in his society's political system, what liberties he is allowed, what priority and place affluence has in his society and what inequalities exist between he and his fellow citizens are direct examples of considerations of what potential that individual has in his society and what aspects of potential are constrained or nurtured by the political system of that society. More specific consideration of the relation between potential and these political issues will be presented in the context of discussing the different types of political systems which currently exist.

What follows is a schematic analysis of the various general types of political systems existing today with regard to the four issues discussed above. While some systems are similar in form between developed and transitional countries, the fundamentally different political situation (see above) of countries in the two realms necessitates treating political systems in developed countries separately from systems in transitional countries.

Part One: Political Systems in Developed Countries

The first two types of political systems to be discussed are both based on constitutional democracies. One is "constitutional democracy with laissez-faire capitalist system," the other is "constitutional democracy with social-democratic or socialistic economic system." While the difference between these two is based on differing economic systems, these differing economic systems result in different political systems. It should be kept in mind that these two "types" are idealizations; they are not exact descriptions of certain

actual systems in existence. There is no "perfect" laissez-faire capitalist system nor any "perfect" socialist system. Possibly it is most useful to regard these two types as poles on a continuum with actual systems sprinkled along it - stretching from the laissez-faire end (Japan, U.S. in the pre-F.D.R. years, Australia) to the socialist end (Sweden, West Germany, Italy, etc.).

In a laissez-faire capitalist constitutional democracy, liberty is of central importance. Individual liberties are guaranteed constitutionally - freedom of expression, religion, assemblage, etc. The legal system aims (with varying integrity and success in varying countries) to preserve these rights. Equality in such a system is formal equality or equality of citizenship. This type of equality is founded upon equality of rights and equal treatment of all individuals before the law. It is essentially a legalistic conception of equality; that is, individuals are considered to be equal if they are legally equal in the society. This conception of equality is compatible with material or substantive inequality. In a system of formal equality, individuals can be unequal in income, education, prestige, authority, etc.

Because this conception of equality is a minimal one (as compared with more encompassing principles of equality such as equality of opportunity and equality of social status), it is not greatly in conflict with liberty in the system. That is to say, unlike the more encompassing types of equality (as will be discussed below), formal equality does not require the abridgement of liberties.

Additionally, the goals of liberty and equality are not greatly in conflict with the goal of affluence in this system. In a laissez-faire capitalist (constitutional democratic) system, the individual is provided with his liberties and with his "formal" equality and let loose to participate for his own gain in the economic system. Affluence is a central goal of such

a system. A basic tenet of the system is minimum interference between the government and the economic system. Ideally (in this system) no modifications or constrictions are placed on the economic system for the purpose of achieving the political goals of liberty and equality. Liberty and affluence co-exist peacefully as central goals of this system by grace of this separation of the political and economic components of the system.

The United States in the early part of this century is a good example of this general sort of system. A resolutely capitalist economy was combined with a strong emphasis on basic liberties. Government was kept to a minimum, business was given free rein and quite plainly the business of the nation was business. The Depression moved the United States away from this pole; more encompassing types of equality came to be accepted as goals, the economic system was no longer left untouched by the government.

In a social-democratic or socialist constitutional democracy, a broader conception of equality is utilized than in the system described above, and equality is a much more emphasized and pursued goal. The principle of formal equality is expanded in two ways. First, there is equality of opportunity, that is, the equalization of social and economic opportunities with respect to education, jobs, housing, health care, etc. This sort of equality goes beyond formal equality and deals with the realm of the actual. For example, rather than simply guaranteeing that all individuals have legally equal status with regard to availability of housing an equality of opportunity approach attempts to equalize or compensate for other factors that are relevant to obtaining housing (information, money, racial issues, etc.).

Secondly, there is equality of social status. This term, social status, used by Dohrendorf,[3] is a general way of describing the realm of actual things and conditions such as income, property, social prestige, authority, and education level. A system which has equality of social status as a goal

attempts to equalize the actual modes and forms of the social existence of its members. In short, it attempts to make individuals have equal income, property, social prestige, etc.

The difference between the three types of equality - formal equality, equality of opportunity and equality of social status - can be highlighted with the oft-used race analogy. Given that participation in a social-political system can be conceived of in some way as a race among constituents, formal equality assures that all members are guaranteed equal status as members of the race, equality of opportunity assures that all members will have an equal start in the race and equality of social status works to have all members finish the race at the same time.

While both equality of opportunity and equality of social status are goals in the social-democratic constitutional democracy system, they are often goals more in the sense of ideals rather than tangible targets. Equality of opportunity, the less encompassing of the two, has gained very widespread acceptance as a goal in Western constitutional democracies. In these countries it has evolved in the past 35 years to the point where it is considered as fundamental and perhaps even as measurable a goal as the traditionally fundamental principle of formal equality.

Equality of social status remains, on the other hand, more of a partial goal or ideal rather than a definite goal in these countries. Social democracies tend not to pursue actively a goal of total equality of social status, rather some sort of minimum floor is established (minimum income, basic housing, basic education, etc.) and effort is directed toward getting all citizens at least on this level. In Western social-democracies (for example, France, Germany, Sweden, England, etc.) such minimum floors have been achieved to a great extent. At the same time, however, the basic gap between rich

and poor and the general distorted distribution of wealth have remained relatively stable for the last 20 years. This points clearly to the fact that equality of social status is of a partial goal or is only partially pursued in such political systems.

The conflict between liberty and equality, minimal in the laissez-faire system described above (because of the narrow principle of equality employed), is greater in social-democratic systems. Dohrendorf[4] points out that in order to effect equality of opportunity and even partial equality of social status some individual liberties must be constrained. This of course has become a major social issue in countries such as the U.S. which apply reverse discrimination policies. In order to effect such a policy, that is one aimed at equalizing opportunity, certain individual liberties have to be constrained (equal consideration or treatment). Similarly, measures aimed at achieving minimal floors of social status (progressive tax structures, subsidized housing, guaranteed income) constrain the freedom of some individuals to maximize their own situation. The top end is constricted to achieve an acceptable bottom end.

In parellel fashion the conflict between equality and affluence is of some importance in social-democratic systems whereas it is slight in laissez-faire systems (as discussed previously). In a social-democratic system, economics and politics are purposefully mixed; the principle of separation between those two realms does not exist. The economic system is "tampered with" for the sake of political goals. Certain industries or utilities may be nationalized and run on the basis of service criteria rather than profit criteria. Tax structures are weighted to take more from those who earn or have more. Structural changes in the economic system, demanded by the market, may be resisted and blocked by the government because of the social

effects (unemployment, dislocation, etc.) that such changes would bring. The capitalist economic system is not allowed to "run free;" it is regulated by the government for political and social ends. Affluence does not stand apart and unfettered as a goal; it is in conflict with equality in the social-democratic system.

Along with laissez-faire and social-democratic capitalist constitutional democracies there exist in the developed world Communist systems. While a general "type" will be explicated below, this "type" is only the roughest generalization of what is at least a tripart set: first, the Soviet Union, a subgroup of its own; then, the Soviet bloc countries Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland; and then the independents Yugoslavia and Romania. All of these countries are, on paper at least, constitutional democracies. They all have constitutions which say that their system is democratic. As mentioned in the chapter on Democratization, the dispute over which countries are true democracies is an involved one. My view is that the democratic procedures of the Communist countries have significantly less bearing on the workings of the political system than do the democratic procedures of Western democracy. Individual participation in the political process in the West does collectively effect the running of the political system. Individual participation in the East seems rather to be a ritual of validation for those who run the system. Leaving this question of participation, we turn to the issues of equality, liberty and affluence.

Communist systems hold equality of social status as a primary goal. Unlike social-democratic systems which attempt generally to curtail the range of inequalities in social status amongst members, a Communist system ostensibly strives to achieve substantive equality of income, property, social prestige, authority, education. This goal is quite stridently stated by such systems and is a central principle of the ideology which legitimates

the governments in power in those countries. Nonetheless, what generally exists in these Communist countries is a two-tier system - Party members and non-Party members. The former group (normally 3-10% of the population) enjoys substantially more equality than the latter - higher incomes, better housing, wider access to consumer items, greater authority and prestige, etc. Inequalities within the second group, the majority of the population, tend to be much smaller than the inequalities in non-Communist Western countries: income differential is narrow, housing varies less, property or capital holdings vary less, etc.

The question of liberty in Communist systems is particularly complex. As Dohrendorf has argued, equality and liberty by nature conflict in that extending equality to the realms of opportunity and social status involves the constriction of individual liberties. Thus, Communist systems with their particular emphasis on equality and their pursuit of the most encompassing form of equality (equality of social status) are likely to conflict with liberty. And, in fact, in the developed world it is in Communist countries that questions of liberty are thought to be the most troublesome. Communist countries tend to defend their suppression of liberties by reference to the natural conflict between equality and liberty. True liberty, they say, cannot exist until genuine substantive equality exists. The West, they argue, provides no real liberty because it provides no real equality. Only the Communist countries, in their own view, are heading toward real equality and so liberty will only ever exist in these countries. Constrictions of liberty are justified as a short-term measure necessary for reaching the ultimate goal of an equal and just system.

A basic confusion, however, resides in and undermines this rationale. The range of liberties possible in a system is a broad one. At the fundamental

and basic end of the range are liberties relevant to the conflict of order vs. liberty: right of self-expression, travel, assemblage, religion, etc. At the other end of the range are the liberties relevant to the conflict of equality vs. liberty: right of maximization of return, right of unfettered participation in economic system, etc. A significant part of the liberties which are habitually curtailed in Communist countries are those relevant to the order vs. liberty conflict. Liberties are being abridged not in pursuit of equality but in pursuit of order.

I suggested at the start of this section on political systems that common to the developed countries was that they had crossed the order "hump" and were facing the affluence "hump." That is, I said that the order vs. liberty question had been replaced by affluence vs. liberty and equality vs. liberty questions. I would now modify this to say that in the Communist countries the order question has been only imperfectly solved. It has been solved in such a way that the pursuit and accomplishment of industrialization has largely been possible but at the same time the continued suppression of liberty is needed to maintain order.

In other words, in the Communist countries the order vs. liberty conflict is held at bay so that the pursuit of industrialization can be accomplished. At times (Budapest 1956, Prague 1968, Poland 1970) the order-liberty conflict forces itself to the forefront. The political response is to further decrease liberties in order to reinstate order. Inherent in the political order of these countries is, therefore, both a great deal of force (police power, Soviet force) and the suppression of fundamental liberties.

In Communist systems affluence does not exist as a goal in the same way that it does in the two previously discussed democratic systems. Economics, in Communist systems, is held to be subservient to and derivative of politics. The economic system is not a material domain to be "tampered with" if need

be for political ends; economic actions, structures and goals are all essentially political in nature. Affluence therefore is not thought of simply as an economic goal; it is considered to be a political question. Affluence is seen as the basis of a certain political attitude, "bourgeois materialism," which is antithetical to the goals - equality, solidarity, stability - of the political system. Resultingly, the economic systems in Communist countries have been almost exclusively geared toward the production of industrial items deemed essential to the country's political needs (power, independence, etc.) rather than to consumer items.

A further characteristic of Communist systems that must be mentioned is their stated allegiance to the primacy of the group. The individual works not for his own reward but for the benefit of the group. The success of the system is measured by the success of the group. Group potential is primary to individual potential. While this "primacy of the group" is a bulwark of the stated ideology of these countries, it is extremely disputable as to whether it has taken hold at the level of individual belief and attitude. This question can only be answered by thorough sociological studies which may or may not exist. The remarkably low levels of individual productivity in these countries may, however, be some indication.

We have seen, then, the varying ways that equality, liberty and affluence function as goals in the three major types of political systems in the developed world. Equality, liberty and affluence serve as both criteria of success for the political systems as well as preconditions for the realization of certain areas of human potential. The different types of systems place differing emphasis among these three goals and thereby provide differently for the human potential of their members.

In the laissez-faire constitutional democracies the political system

works primarily to guarantee the individual's basic liberties and to allow the individual freedom of action in the economic realm. The basic characteristic of such a system is a "hands-off" attitude toward individual potential; the system simply allows its members freedom to pursue whatever they want.

Social-democratic systems go beyond just acting as the basic framework framing the individual's unconstrained pursuit of potential. Such systems take an active part in guiding individuals and constraining them. These systems incorporate certain criteria of acceptability of an individual's conditions, opportunities and social status. The political system in this case, then, goes beyond concern merely for the individual's possibilities to concern for the individual's actualities (housing, jobs, education, etc.).

Communist systems take an even more active and extensive role in the exercise and realization of their members' potential. The system is not merely a framework (laissez-faire) nor a paternalistic caretaker (social-democratic) but claims to be the very medium of potentials realization. In a Communist system, the individual does not exist apart from the system. All actions, ideas and beliefs are considered to be fundamentally political in nature. Thereby every constituent individual's actions, ideas and beliefs have meaning only through their relation to the political system. This notion was carried to the extreme in Stalin's days when there was an ideologically "correct" way for doing everything. There was, for example, a Marxist-Leninist method of fishing that was to be followed at all times. While this notion has rescinded in fanaticism with time, the basic complete or all-encompassing relation of a Communist political system with all forms of life contained within it remains a basic property of Communist systems.

Part Two: Political Systems in Transitional Countries

Before analyzing the various general types of political systems found in transitional countries, it is perhaps useful to recapitulate very briefly the situation and the particular dilemma inherent in the situation of transitional countries as presented in the first part of this section.

Transitional countries are in the process of complete transformation. They are in the midst of revolutionizing all aspects of their society: economic, cultural and social. They are industrializing: mechanizing, technologizing, organizing, etc. They are trying to build a modern social order and this requires a standard language, basic education, health care, some sense of national culture and national coherency.

In considering the political systems of these countries it is imperative that we realize that the primary characteristic of political systems of these countries is the search for political order compatible with the transition to modernity. Above all, these systems are concerned with the basic "governability" of the countries. Is there some consensus among citizens concerning basic political values and goals? If not, how could one come about? The fundamental political issue is order and the fundamental political conflict is order vs. liberty. Yet, as argued before, these countries also face the demand for industrialization, the demand for affluence. This basic issue coexists fretfully with the issue of order and this forms the dilemma of the transitional countries: the attempt to solve <u>successive</u> political problems - order on the one hand and affluence, liberty and equality on the other - <u>simultaneously</u>.

The system types discussed below are divided into two basic groups - non-pluralist and pluralist. A pluralist system is one in which some legal means of the transfership of power prevails and competition for this leadership

exists (competition between different groups,not simply competition between members of a single ruling party). A pluralist system may be democratic in the sense that the leaders are elected by the people or it may not. Within these two groups, further divisions are made. Three types of non-pluralist systems are discussed: leftist, rightist and "non-ideological" (for lack of a better name). Two types of pluralist systems are discussed: democratic and non-democratic.

Non-pluralist political systems are normally run by a single leader, a small group or a medium-sized group (a party or a military group, for example). In all these cases, opposition to the government is not allowed. Common to non-pluralist systems of all ideological stances is their basic approach to the maintenance of order, to the order vs. liberty conflict: liberties are widely sacrificed for the sake of order. Governments in non-pluralist systems vary widely, however, in the manner in which they justify or legitimate their rule, the way in which they strive to solidify political order and their pursuit or non-pursuit of equality, affluence and liberty. It is these differences that shall be discussed below.

The first type to be considered is Communist or socialist non-pluralist systems. Such systems are founded upon some version of Marxist ideology although the versions are often quite different: Cuba utilizes a heavily Sovietized Marxist-Leninist ideology mixed with the powerful figure of Castro; China centers upon Maoist and post-Maoist branches of Marxism; Tanzania incorporates a sort of nationalist socialism dominated more by their leader, Nyerere, than by strict Marxist ideology; and Ethiopia has adopted almost a Stalinist ideology adapted in some unusual way to a rural African country.

Justification for the non-pluralism (that is, the widespread suppression of liberties) of these leftist non-pluralist systems comes directly from the

ideology of the system. Fundamental to a leftist system is the belief that in a properly organized society, by which is meant a classless society, conflict of interest does not exist. For this reason, non-pluralism is considered to be a norm or even a goal. The continued need to suppress liberties to maintain the non-pluralist order is seen as a symptom of the difficulty of achieving the desired political state.

Equality is not simply a goal in these countries, it is seen as the primary means for building a stable political order. Equality of material and social status is the key issue and in these underdeveloped countries this means an effort to provide BHN (Basic Human Need) to all citizens: enough food to get by, some shelter or housing, clothes, a minimum standard of health care and possibly some basic education.

This effort of generally leftist underdeveloped countries to provide BHN has been called a "New Approach" by Western analysts[5] - new with respect to the traditional Western-style models of development emphasizing a push for rapid growth and industrialization. The traditional approach, which Rothstein[6] calls "the growth and industrialization approach," accepts the necessity of inequalities, stresses savings and investments, strives to increase exports and to raise productivity. The New Approach, by contrast, he says, replaces "growth and industrialization" with "equity and agriculture." The emphasis is on reducing inequalities, developing agriculture, developing basic human conditions and often limiting foreign intervention.

In these leftist non-pluralist systems then, order and equality are predominant over liberty and affluence as either concerns or goals. Order is generally maintained through force while it is hoped that with some success in providing BHN and equality some consensual social order will take root which will solidify and legitimate the political order. It is only when these have

been achieved (BHN and a consensual political order) that the goals of liberty and affluence can be considered.

The other major type of non-pluralist system is of course the capitalist, rightist systems. Such systems (Brazil, Argentina, Phillipines, South Korea, Indonesia, etc.) are typically run by an autocrat or by a small group which has close ties with the military forces. Justification for the enforced non-pluralism (for the suppression of liberties) is quite different than it is in leftist non-pluralist systems. Non-pluralism is not a goal as it is in the leftist idea of a classless society. Rather, rightist governments tend to justify the suppression of liberties as a necessary measure to prevent the spread of leftist thinking and leftist action in the country. A leftist system, the rightist leaders claim, is the real threat to liberty and so liberties are suspended to combat that threat.

The relation between the goals of equality and affluence is revised from what it is in a leftist system. In leftist systems, equality is a primary goal and is thought to be a means for fostering order. In rightist systems, affluence is a primary goal and is thought to be the means by which political and social order can be generated and maintained. Equality of opportunity and social status is a very secondary or even non-existent goal. The rightist systems do not emphasize BHN. Instead, they pursue the "growth and industrialization" approach to development. The idea is that while inequalities are inevitable in their developmental approach, if the general level of affluence is raised quickly, the government in power will be legitimized by the increased average wealth of citizens.

In rightist systems then, the fundamental issue of order is held at bay through the suppression of liberties; affluence is the primary goal both as an end in itself and as a means for fostering some sort of consensual political order. Equality and liberty are shelved, to be considered only when

affluence and order are to some significant extent achieved.

There is a third type of non-pluralist system which is neither distinctively leftist nor rightist. I have in mind here the systems dominated by a single leader who runs the country completely for his own sake and for his own gain. The prime example is possibly Idi Amin in Uganda, although other such leaders have existed or do exist (Bokassa, Stroessner, etc.).

In such a system, order is everything. The leader strives to maintain order through force; he does not concern himself with nurturing some consensual political order. He does not justify his suppression of liberties as either necessary to promote some ideological goal (as in leftist systems) or to prevent the spread of certain ideological elements (as in rightist systems). Rather, suppression of liberties has the singular purpose of maintaining and increasing his control of the political system.

As noted above, this sort of leader does not concern himself with working to promote or foster some consensual order. He does not attempt to increase equality with the hope that this will encourage some basic social order. He does not attempt to increase affluence with the hope that this will encourage some basic social order. The fact is, social order is this sort of leader's enemy. He exists <u>in spite</u> of the people of the country; the stronger the social order the more he is threatened. It is in the interest of such a leader to obstruct and disintegrate whatever basic consensus does exist among the people. He does not have the <u>consent</u> of the people and so he wants this consent to be as weak a force as possible. Thus equality, liberty and affluence are not only not goals in this type of system, they are anti-goals - they are in opposition to the basic interests of the leaders.

Such systems, therefore, may achieve some state of political order but they do so by disintegrating and disarraying the social order, not by promoting

it. Amin's Uganda exemplified this retroactive tendency very clearly. Amin's grip on the country increased to the extent that he destroyed the coherent fabric of organized life in Uganda. When the Tanzanians took over the country, they found that they had "inherited" a country which was barely feasible as a working nation - so obliterated were the basic structures of the society.

In pluralist systems, which on the whole tend to be rarer in transitional countries than non-pluralist systems, competition for leadership (competition outside the ruling group) exists as well as some legal means for the transfer of power. Underlying pluralism in transitional countries is some at least basic consensus, some social order rooted in an agreement upon basic values, goals or beliefs. Unlike non-pluralist systems which rest at most on some minimal consent from their society's members, pluralist systems rest upon at least a modicum of consensus. The origin of this consensus varies. A look at notably pluralist systems in transitional countries (India, Kenya, pre-1973 Chile, sometimes Peru and Venezuela) might tempt one to posit that pluralism tends to develop in those underdeveloped countries which have had a certain historical stability as a nation, or as a single culture. Such stability would appear to promote the sense of shared culture in the society - the key ingredient for social order. Yet there are certainly underdeveloped nations with similarly long histories as a single somewhat unified political unit (China is similar to India in this respect, Argentina to Chile, etc.) which are not pluralist. It is unlikely that a single cause can be isolated as that responsible for the development or lack of development of pluralism in transitional societies. In any case, before preceding to a brief look at the two general types of pluralist systems in transitional nations - non-democratic and democratic - an obvious but essential aspect of pluralism which fundamentally distinguishes the situation of the individual in such systems as compared to the individual in non-pluralist systems must be highlighted: in pluralist systems

there is some at least basic relation of accountability between the leaders and the members of the nation.

In non-democratic pluralist systems, pluralism tends to reside at the level of groups in the society. Individuals do not select leaders through popular vote but different groups (trade unions, business sector, professionals, military, religious groups) have influence and input to the selection of leaders. Transfer of leadership, legally specified, is guided by pressure from the various groups. Mexico, with its 6-year legally rotating but non-elected Presidents, is an example of such a system. Unlike many non-pluralist nations in Central and South America, the political schisms in Mexico between competing groups (particularly trade unions and business sector) are not so wide that no political agreement can be reached without the heavy application of coercive force.

And so in non-democratic pluralist systems the order vs. liberty conflict tends to be resolvable without the massive suppression of liberties characteristic of non-pluralist systems. Typically, however, "resolutions" of the order vs. liberty conflict in non-democratic pluralist systems are delicate and subject to collapse when difficulties (economic, etc.) arise. While some liberties are generally allowed in these systems (certainly more than are in non-pluralist systems), liberty is a bit like a safety valve - when the order is threatened, it closes down. It is not uncommon for such systems to flip-flop between pluralism and non-pluralism as the fragile consensus, the precarious socio-political order,is buffeted by economic, political and social trends and pressures. Peru is an example of a system flip-flopping between pluralism and non-pluralism, striving to bolster a ravaged but perceptible social consensus in the face of marked economic problems. Venezuela is another example, although its oil revenues have at least temporarily greased the wheels of pluralism.

Aside from the standard order vs. liberty conflict the pursuit and conflict between other goals (equality, affluence) tends to depend most generally on the ideological leanings of the particular leaders in power. Right-leaning leaders (as in Mexico, for example) tend to favor affluence over equality; left-leaning leaders (Peru under its socialist leaders 10 years back) favor equality over affluence. In most cases, however, all of these goals are at least somewhat pursued. The accountability of leaders to the societal consensus tends to favor broad political paths rather than the more "extreme" concentrations on "just affluence" or "just equality" sometimes found in non-pluralist systems.

Democratic systems in transitional countries (India, Kenya, pre-1973 Chile) are marked of course by the election of leaders through popular or representative vote, the regular holding of elections for leaders and the basic right of citizens to participate directly in the political process. Democratic systems generally reflect the existence of a more developed social consensus than exists in non-democratic pluralist systems and non-pluralist systems. This social consensus allows the order-liberty conflict to be resolved without the widespread suppression of liberties. The allowance of individual citizen participation in the political process is, of course, the granting of a major liberty.

Democratic systems in transitional countries resemble non-democratic pluralist systems in many of the features pointed to in the preceding analysis of non-democratic pluralist systems. First, as in non-democratic pluralist systems, the social and political order in democratic transitional countries is highly susceptible to economic, political and social currents and problems. And when order is threatened, liberties are quickly abridged in response. Secondly, as in non-democratic pluralist systems, the pursuit of goals follows a basic pattern: given that the order-liberty conflict is at least temporarily

resolved, the goals of equality and affluence are pursued in accordance with the ideological leanings of the leaders. In Chile, for example, during the 1950's and 1960's, alternating liberal and conservative administrations pursued alternating emphasis on equality vs. affluence. Thirdly, the fact that leaders in democratic transitional countries are accountable to their nation's citizens tends to lead to some attempt to pursue all the major goals to at least some noticeable degree. Popular selection tends to make leaders try to cover all the "political bases." This is noticeable in, for example, India's case where there is a strong emphasis both on equality (many basic socialist measures exist) and on affluence (development is pursued avidly) with a certain political tendency to tout both as the nation's primary goal.

In the first section of this chapter we saw that each type of political system in the developed world strikes a certain balance between the goals of liberty, affluence and equality. The place and the treatment of human potential in each type of system depends to some degree on this balance. Systems which emphasize affluence at the expense of equality encourage certain aspects of human potential; systems which forego liberty or affluence for the sake of equality encourage others and so on. We tend to have some notion of what the suspension of liberty or the lack of affluence or the lack of equality can entail for the individual in these countries and so in combination with the presented analysis of the various systems we can derive some idea of the situation or treatment of human potential in these political systems.

In the second part of this chapter a similar analysis of the basic issues (order, liberty, equality and affluence) in political systems in transitional countries was presented. The various types of systems were characterized by their approach to and their balancing of these principal issues. Yet, before the link can be made between the basic issues and the role and treatment of

human potential in these political systems, a closer look at certain overall differences between developed and transitional countries must be taken.

Order, liberty, equality and affluence are concerns common to political systems in both developed and transitional countries. Due to the marked differences between these two categories of nations, however, the relation between these basic political issues or goals and human potential tends to be quite different across the two groups. In general, because of the less developed and often less stable economic and political conditions, the non-achievement of these goals entails much more serious constraint of human potential in transitional countries than in developed countries.

For example, if we think of a lack of equality in developed countries we tend to think of duplexes vs. mansions, taking the bus vs. taking the plane, Howard Johnson's vs. The Ritz. In transitional countries where marginal existence is often the norm, a lack of equality can mean that the "less equal" members are starving and dying from a lack of food, shelter, medicine, etc.

The case is similar with liberty. While in the West curtailed liberty may entail discrimination, harassment and unjust punishment, in transitional countries a lack of liberty frequently means indefinite and barbaric imprisonment, torture or death.

And with affluence the same pattern holds. A person in a developed country who fails to achieve affluence is generally in a fundamentally different (better) situation than a person in a transitional country who does not achieve affluence.

In short, the non-achievement of liberty, affluence and equality in a transitional country constrains and demotes human potential qualitatively more seriously than does the non-achievement of these goals in a developed country. While political systems in both types of countries (developed and transitional)

can be characterized by their approach and weighting of these basic goals, the relation of a political system to its members' potential varies markedly between the two groups.

Appendix One: Specific description of the pursuit of liberty, equality and affluence in a nation (U.S.A.)

Throughout this chapter on political systems, discussion of the issues or goals of affluence, liberty and equality has been at a general level. In order to begin to make a connection between this sort of general analysis and the actual exercise of human potential, it is useful to give some idea of what these political goals can actually lead to in terms of political actions. In this section, a very brief outline of political actions in the U.S., which can be understood in light of the above discussed goals (affluence, liberty, equality), will be sketched out.

Outline

1. Liberty:
   A. Legal aid measures
   B. Rights or limitations on police (entering without search warrant on grounds of due suspicion, etc.)
   C. "Legality in government" concerns

2. Formal equality
   A. 14th amendment
   B. ERA
   C. Civil rights measures

3. Equality of opportunity and equality of status
   A. Affirmative Action
   B. Compensatory schooling
   C. Progressive tax structures
   D. Medicare and Medicaid

4. Affluence
   A. Standard of living
   B. Inflation, unemployment
   C. Housing
   D. Transportation
      etc.

5. Post-material or post-affluence concerns
   A. Mental health
   B. Environment
   C. Community structure
   D. Crime

This is by no means intended as an exhaustive summary of the pursuit of political goals in the U.S. today. Rather it is simply a list of a few examples of current political topics in the U.S. and the issue (liberty, equality or affluence) that these topics relate to.

Ideally, the U.S. views legal equality and rights equality as primary to material concerns. The system becomes diseased to the extent that material inequalities between citizens are causal of legal and rights inequalities. When this occurs, the system is allowing the primary requirements of potential to be constrained by forces which are meant to be derivative of these primary requirements.

The U.S. has perhaps demonstrated greater legal concern for formal equality of its citizens than have European countries. European countries have in turn shown more concern than the U.S. for material equality of their citizens.

The U.S. has shown more concern or at least makes more noise about the post-material or post-affluence issues. These issues tend to be post-modern concerns: while they may have existed as problems for a long time in the society, they become society-wide "crises" as aftereffects of modernization. For example, crime is something of a problem in most societies. Yet in the U.S., rates of violent crime are 5-10 times higher than in Western European countries and often even higher in comparison with crime rates in less modernized countries. Crime as a societal "crisis-issue," as it now is in the U.S., is therefore in some sense a post-modern concern.

The U.S. being in many ways more modernized than other countries has suffered more from these post-modern concerns (community collapse, environmental destruction, crime, etc.). It could be argued that the U.S. has thereby been more politically progressive in some non-ideological sense in that it is

politically coming to grips with the problematic results of "progress" while other countries are still primarily concerned with "progressing."

Table 1: Summary of political systems

	Developed	Transitional
luralistic	Laissez-faire capitalist democracies High emphasis on liberty and affluence Low emphasis on equality (only formal equality is sought) Social democratic capitalist democracies High emphasis on equality (equality of opportunity and status) Conflict between equality and liberty Conflict between equality and affluence Economics and politics mingled	Non-democratic pluralist A. Right-leaning (Mexico, Ghana) "Some" liberty which conflicts with order Affluence conflicts with equality (low emphasis on equality) B. Left-leaning (Peru in 1970's, Tanzania) "Some" liberty which conflicts with order Equality (high emphasis) conflicts with affluence Democratic A. Right-leaning (Kenya, Venezuela) Moderate liberty which conflicts with order High emphasis on affluence, low emphasis on equality B. Left-leaning (India, Chile in 1960's) Moderate liberty which conflicts with order High emphasis on equality, lower emphasis on affluence
on luralistic	Communist High equality which conflicts with affluence High equality which conflicts with liberty Liberty conflicts with order Economics and politics are fused	Communist (North Korea, Cuba, Ethiopia) Liberty suspended for sake of order High emphasis on equality, low emphasis on affluence Right-wing (South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Argentina) Liberty suspended for sake of order High emphasis on affluence, low emphasis on equality "Non-ideological" (Amin's Uganda, Paraguay) Liberty suspended for sake of order Affluence and equality often ignored for sake of order

V. The International Political System

Stepping back from the analysis of national political systems and their treatment and consideration of human potential, we enter an even larger and more diffuse context of the individual - the international political system. Here we go from the interactions of individuals in a group to the interactions of groups in a collection of groups. The individual is one step removed. The international political system will be analyzed with regard to certain major issues. First, the effect of modernization upon the system will be discussed; that is, the basic transformation of the system itself which has occurred in the modern age will be explicated. Then, two questions of particular relevance to the individual and to human potential will be raised: "What is the relation of individual interest to group interest in the international system?" and, "What forces constrain, guide and impel the members (nations) of the international system?" And, to conclude, the possibility of evolution of the system will be considered with reference to the often discussed notion of a world community.

There is some agreement among analysts of international relations that the 20th century has brought about a transformation of the international system. Traditional statecraft, much revered by scholars of the system, has been largely overturned and supplanted. Before considering what the system has become, it is useful to consider very briefly what it was.

Classical statecraft was born out of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and endured until the outbreak of war in 1914. This system rested upon several crucial principles: 1) states are formally and ideally equal and sovereign; 2) mercantilism - the belief in and pursuit of free trade and commercialism; 3) the separation between international and domestic affairs; and 4) the balance of power as the maintenance of peace and order. This form of international

system has been called "the billiard ball model": states interacted only externally - or rather external issues of war, peace and security did not greatly mingle with domestic issues of economics, internal politics, etc. During the reign of classical statecraft, a handful of European nations dominated and in some sense were the international system. Many parts of the world were only marginally affected by international events and many of these parts were not yet organized into "states" in the European sense of the word.

The transformation of the international system in this century has hinged upon two overarching changes: globalization and interdependence[1]. Globalization of the international system has resulted from the vast outward spread of the wave of modernization. The push for industrialization has reached all corners of the world. Nationalism has extended its grasp globally - essentially all people are now members of nation-states. International institutions now exist in which all individuals of the world (with minor exceptions) are represented. In short, the international political system is no longer simply a collection of a small group of dominant powers; all of the world belongs to and participates in the system.

The growth of interdependence has taken multiple forms - economic, strategic, ideological, etc. The both ravenous and expansive nature of modern economic systems has led to a steady increase in the amount and the importance of trade in the world. The average modernized economy cannot exist without a large number of imports and exports. Nations have come to be economically reliant upon each other in ways unknown in the pre-modern world. This economic interdependence has resulted in the politicization of economic transitions. Given that economic relations now affect the security, the power, and the prestige of nations, it is inevitable that these relations become "loaded" in the international sense. The billiard-ball model is shattered - external

and internal affairs now interact to a high degree.

The interdependence of strategic concerns has also grown to be of crucial importance in the modern age. This century has seen the globalization of war. Military conflict has lost its limits, a major war calls upon all of the internal resources of nations and can involve great numbers of nations in many or all regions of the world. Nations are thus strategically interdependent in ways unparallelled in the pre-modern world. Huge strings of alliances tacit and explicit bind all nations in strategic relations with each other.

Along with economic and strategic interdependence, a certain political or ideological interdependence has arisen in this century. Political movements have grown beyond national bounds. Nation to nation links are often forged upon or at least affected by political allegiances. The world is in some way carved into three huge political networks: Western liberal capitalism, Communism and non-alignment.

In the modern international political system, then, economic affairs have become politicized; the separation between internal and external affairs has dissolved; the balance of power has become globalized; the institutions, the effects and the workings of the system have become globalized and nations are now interdependent upon each other in numerous vital ways. In the modern world, therefore, international events are of much wider and greater importance to the individual than in past ages. The individual in the modern age is highly affected, constrained and benefited by events that occur outside of the collective to which he belongs (his nation). His life (and obviously, thereby, his potential) is significantly permeated and penetrated by the international system.

The individual is tied into, or at least considerably linked to, international events, actions and relations. Yet the international system remains

an arena of collectives (nation-states). It is these collectives that make contact and carry out a large share of international relations (non-nation-state transnational actors also participate in international relations). Individuals are highly affected by a realm of events which they do not directly take part in. Given this situation, it is logical to ask: "What is the relation between the interests of these collectives and the interests of their individual members?"

To speak separately of national (that is, collective) interests and individuals' interests requires that some "national interest" be identifiable. That some recognizable cluster of interests is shared by almost all nations is generally agreed (by analysts). Loosely, this concept of "national interest" centers upon the pursuit of national security, power, stability, prestige and expansion. That is to say, very generally speaking, nations tend to want the same things for themselves.

The relation of an individual's interests to his nation's interest depends most obviously on the type of political system of the nation. If the nation is run by a representative (democratically elected) government,then the state interest can be seen as having some significant relation to individual member interest. If the government is non-representative, then the possibility of a fundamental division of state and individual interests exists. More specifically, there tend to be two types of representative governments: those which rely on some minimal consent of the people (the example was given in Chapter 3 of the Polish leader who lost this consent) and those which exist in spite of the people, that is, those which do not rely on even the most minimal consent (e.g., Idi Amin, et.al.). The former, while non-representative, most likely maintain at least some link between the interest of the state and the interest of the people. The latter tend to disregard freely individual members' interests

in the pursuit of state interests.

In non-pluralist systems (in either developed or transitional countries), systems without legal transfer of power, the tendency exists for a particular government's interests to be equated with the national interest. That is, because in a non-pluralist system no different governments or leaders are envisioned, a particular set of leaders becomes "the state," when in actuality what may be bad for a particular government may ultimately be good for the nation.

This tendency toward the overlapping of the nation's interest and a particular government's interest exists to a lesser extent in pluralist systems. It is certainly not unknown for a democratically elected government to take a certain action in conflict with some individual's interests and justify the action as being in "the national interest" when in reality the action was motivated by that particular government's concern for its own stability or survival.

At root, however, there exists a basic conflict between a nation's interest and the interests of its individual members. Even when a nation is run democratically and even when the government does not take the national interest into its own hands for its own purposes, the pursuit of national interests (security, stability, power, prestige, expansion) will collide with and abridge the pursuit of individual interests. For example, nations sometimes go to war, not because their survival is threatened, but, because they are pursuing goals of power, expansion, the defense of political interests, etc. When a nation goes into such a war, it requires some of its members to fight the war. Some are killed or wounded. That is, some individuals' interests (life, health) are put aside for the sake of certain national interests. The individual may well feel that his own interests have nothing to do with the war but as he is a member of the nation he must answer to his nation first and

his own interests second.

The basic fact is that groups, in particular, nations, have interests of their own. These interests are not singly the sum of their constituents' interests. In fact, group interests often require the abridgement of individual interests. The nation is greater than the sum of its parts; its interests are prior to the specific interests of its members. The international system, being an arena where these group interests are pursued or acted out, is therefore a system not wholly conducive to individual interests. Individual potential flourishes more by grace than by necessity in the international political system.

The international political system is, as we have been saying, a political system in which the "individuals," that is to say, the members, are groups. These members, like individual members in a domestic political system, have their own interests (national interests) and act upon them. What constrains or regulates this competition between nations? In a domestic political system, individual pursuit of interest is constrained or regulated by at least three things: the nation's system of justice, individual morality, and a sense of belonging to the system, a sense of shared culture. Do these same ordering forces exist in the international political system? If not, what does keep order in the system?

International law does exist. There are bodies of rules which have the status of law; there is an international court of justice. And international law does seem to serve several functions. Bull[2], for example, argues that international law helps to identify the idea of a society of states, makes clear certain basic rules of coexistence and helps mobilize compliance with these rules. Yet there is a basic difference between international law and domestic law (as it exists in most countries) that renders international law

fundamentally weaker than domestic law: there is no centralized agency of force whose task it is and whose force is sufficient to enforce international law. International law, therefore, serves more as a reminder than a keeper of order in the international political system.

Turning next to morality, the question is, does some group to group morality prevail in the international system which parellels individual to individual morality such as it may be found in domestic systems? Niebuhr's ideas regarding morality of groups versus morality of individuals bear directly on this question. As a general rule, Niebuhr[3] states, group morality tends to be "less advanced" than individual morality. Morality, Niebuhr says, is based in some way on bonds of empathy that humans at times feel for each other. Such bonds are inevitably stronger within a collective than across collectives. The reason for this is that self-interest can be related much more easily to other individuals of the same collective than to individuals of a different collective. While this characteristic of humans may be regrettable, it is, according to Niebuhr, largely unavoidable. As a result, nation to nation morality remains a fundamentally weaker force than individual to individual morality.

It can be argued that some sense of belonging, some sense of community, does exist among the members of the international system. International relation scholars are quick to point to the diplomatic institutions, territorial water agreements, the international postal system, the Geneva Convention agreements, the United Nations, etc. as evidence that the international political system is not just a <u>system</u> of states but is a <u>society</u> of states. What distinguishes a society from a mere system is the existence of some basic consensus among members regarding conduct and goals. These features of the international world pointed to by analysts are taken as evidence of the existence of basic consensus.

A reasonable view is that of Bull's[4] who grants that some consensus does exist and that the system of states may be accurately called a society of states. This society is, however, in Bull's view, only a very primitive society, largely amoral and unjust, prone to conflict and comparable to primitive tribal domestic societies in which might made right. The international society is, according to Bull, an anarchical society resting largely on the crude principle of balance of power to keep order rather than on a well-developed sense of community, group morality, or law.

Earlier in this section it was said that the interests of the members of the international system (nations) were, at times, in conflict with and generally prior to the interests of the individuals who make up the groups. Further, it was asserted above that these group interests are pursued with much less regard for morality, legality or basic values than are individual interests in domestic systems. To verify this portrait of the international system as an often brutal realm in which individual human interests are easily disregarded or even actively stifled, the present situation of Cambodia can be considered.

In the years 1975 to 1978, Cambodia was governed by the Khmer Rouge, a relatively small group of Communist guerillas who had successfully defeated Lon Nol (the rightist general who took over the country from Prince Sihanouk in a coup in 1970) and the Americans in the 1970-75 war. By all accounts, the Khmer Rouge government was one of the most savage and despicable governments ever to surface in the world. During its brief reign, it is estimated that close to 2 million Cambodians were killed or starved to death (out of a population of 7 million). While the Khmer Rouge era in Cambodia is one of the most terrible stories in history, what is of interest for our present analysis of the international political system is the period following the fall of the

Khmer Rouge government.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in January of 1979 and after a short war pushed the Khmer Rouge into the far Western part of the country and installed a Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh. It is at this point that the international political system most particularly begins to reveal its problematic workings. Following the Vietnamese takeover, there was a tremendous food shortage. In the summer of 1979, it was estimated that if food was not brought into the country immediately, 1 to 2 million people would starve to death. The call for help went out but the West did not respond. Why? The West refused to recognize the new government and refused to "co-operate" with a government that had taken power by violating the principle of national sovereignty (that is, by invading Cambodia). While the United States had in 1978 denounced the Khmer Rouge as "the worst violator of human rights in the world," the U.S. and Western Europe continued tacitly to support the Khmer Rouge and refused to deal with the Vietnamese-backed government. The lives of 2 million people were placed behind a working principle of the international system. Group interests ran somewhat ahead of individual interests.

The food problem was partially alleviated largely by the result of private contributions and the work of non-political transnational actors (e.g., Oxfam, Red Cross). A second, more serious problem now faces the Cambodian people: the continuation of war. At this time, war continues between the Khmer Rouge forces and the Vietnamese army. The Cambodian people, according to most accounts, prefer the present Vietnamese government over the Khmer Rouge whom they fear enormously. The Vietnamese government is by no means, however, the actual choice of the Cambodians and represents, at root, domination by a foreign power. The continuing war takes lives, creates refugees, disrupts attempts to begin to draw together an almost inhumanly ravaged country. Yet this war is being fought by two groups, neither of whom have the support of the nation's members.

And due to a macabre constellation of competing group interests, it is in the interest of none of the groups involved for the war to end. Consider the interest of the various groups:

The Khmer Rouge: Are interested only in fighting - have no alternative except extinction.

The Vietnamese: Recent U.S. intelligence reports have indicated that while the Vietnamese have fought to solidfy their hold on their occupied territory, they have made no major attempts to make a large push to wipe out the Khmer Rouge completely. Analysts argue that legitimation or tolerance of the Vietnamese-backed government by Cambodians depends largely on it's role as "protector against the Khmer Rouge." Analysts argue that Vietnam has little intention of wiping out the Khmer Rouge and prefers to keep the conflict going.

The Thais: Thailand has been supplying and allowing China to supply the Khmer Rouge on the Thai-Cambodia border. Thailand is afraid of Vietnam and likes to have the Khmer Rouge between Thailand and the Vietnamese army.

The Chinese: China is on extremely bad terms with Vietnam and has always (since 1970, at least) heavily supported the Khmer Rouge. China continues to supply the Khmer Rouge. As a Chinese official said recently, it is very cheap for the Chinese to supply the Khmer Rouge and it serves the Chinese interest of irritating Vietnam.

The West: The West refuses to recognize the Vietnamese-backed government in Cambodia because it exists in violation to the international principle of sovereignty.

The East: Generally, the East supports Vietnam in its policy of protracted war.

Remarkably, shockingly, it is in nobody's interest to bring an end to the war. Nobody, that is, except the Cambodian people. Group interests are dictating a horrifying situation in which a small historic culture is being decimated because the groups of the international system have nothing to gain by peace. Perhaps this case makes clear the split between individual human interests and group interests in the international system.

Given that group interests often run roughshod over individual interests and that groups pursue their interests with more concern for power and force than for morality and legality, the international system is not the ideal arena in which human potential may flourish. To conclude this section, we may ask what are the prospects for <u>evolution</u> in the system. Are transformations in sight which will elevate individual interests to the level of group interests

and which will strengthen the sense of society in the international system so that morality, legality and a sense of shared culture come to be powerful forces of order?

It can be argued that some "welfare state ethos" has evolved in the international system in the last 25 years. Analysts who are fond of pointing to parallels between domestic political systems and the international political system argue that Western democracies made the transition from laissez-faire to welfare state attitudes and policies in the 1930-50 period and that the international system is making a parallel transition one generation later. Basic to the welfare state ethos is the principle that the system must take an active role in protecting and promoting every individual's interest. This principle, applied to the international system, works to redress the split between individual and group interests.

Evidence for the spread of the welfare state ethos to the international system exists primarily in the increased concern for the Third World which has originated (the increased concern) largely in the mid-50's. This "concern" has taken two basic forms - oral (speeches, UN resolutions, declarations, dialogues, etc.) and actual (i.e., aid and assistance). A large amount of aid has, in fact, been given to the Third World in the last 25 years and it is this aid which is the centerpoint for claims that a welfare state ethos has developed in the international system.

Care must be taken, however, in leaping from the existence of aid to the existence of a genuine concern in the international system for the individual and his development. A large part of aid given has been military aid. Of the remaining aid, "economic and social aid," it can be argued that the primary motivation behind it has been political interests (make friends with aid) rather than humanitarian interests. In fact, aid that appears most clearly given for humanitarian purposes continues to come from organizations that are

specifically non-political (Oxfam, Red Cross, etc.). That is, this humanitarian aid comes not from the system but from groups outside of or apart from the system.

Furthermore, aid has declined in the past 15 years. A certain feeling that "aid has failed" pervades the West, and the Third World has to goad and cajole Western countries to agree to give even .7 of 1% of their GNP in aid (this is the figure requested in the New International Economic Order resolutions). Tightening and downturning Western economics also contributes to the decrease in aid.

The idea of an international welfare state has indeed surfaced in this generation. The clearly ambiguous fate of aid efforts casts doubt on the possibility that this welfare principle will genuinely be adopted into the system. In addition to the decline of aid, the past decade has witnessed the emergence of several doubts or objections regarding the welfare ethos in the international system. These objections may point to certain inherent limits in the international system which prevent evolution in the desired direction.

Firstly, questions or doubts have arisen about the very idea of nations acting "humanitarianly." The humanitarian impulse is an individual to individual connection; in reality, however, aid is always one political group or political citizen giving to a different political group or citizen. An impulse may be humanitarian, it is argued, but an action across national boundaries is always in some way political. Asking a nation not to act politically is like asking a tiger not to act like an animal. The humanitarian impulse must inevitably be squeezed through the garlic press of the international system.

Secondly, doubts have arisen about the very morality of attempting to apply the principle of distributive justice (at the heart of the welfare state ethos) to nations in the international system in the same way that we apply it to individuals in a domestic system. To do this, some say[5], (to apply the

principle of distributive justice to nations) is to be guilty of anthropomorphizing nations and this, it is argued, is ethically invalid. It is ethically invalid, the argument holds, because a community of nations is fundamentally unlike a community of individuals - in the community of nations there is not the same shared culture, the same consensus on values and goals that exists and holds together a community of individuals.

Thirdly, doubts have arisen concerning the humanitarian impulse itself. This highly valued impulse surfaced most noticeably during the period of rising affluence and optimistic growth in the West. During the periods when this affluence and growth has been threatened or slowed, the humanitarian impulse has demonstrated a suspicious tendency to wane. Furthermore, even in its most radiant forms, humanitarianism in the West has not shown any indication that Westerners are prepared to make any major sacrifices for the sake of individuals in other nations. At root, then, doubts exist about the very essence of the possibility of a welfare state ethos becoming part of the international political system.

In sum, there appear to be certain limitations in the international system as it presently exists which prevent the elevation of individuals' interests to the level of group interests. The final question, then, is, can the very structure of the system itself be transformed in such a way that the international political system will become humane and just?

Such a question points, of course, to the idea of a world community. If political groups are destined to pursue their interests in conflictual, self-interest and forceful ways, the only solution seems to be to remove the plural nature of groups in the system. Similarly, if the schism between group interests and individual interests is to disappear as well as the schism between group-group morality and individual-individual morality, then a single group of world individuals must emerge.

The "ought" may be apparent; how plausible, however, is the "is?" Is there any sign that a world community may supplant the present international political system? A wide debate about the notion of world community exists, most of it originating in the United States, most of it the product of wishful thinking and vain idealism. While we may see the world community as a political imperative resulting from the flaws of the present international political system, it is necessary to remember that our present international system of nation-states was not formed because some people decided that it was needed; it was formed as the result of very fundamental changes in the world (the process of modernization, more specifically, the push for industrialization). Nationalism, it was argued earlier, is part and parcel of the achievement of industrialization and modernization. If we claim that nationalism is now on the way out, then we must be able to point to some transforming forces beyond modernization that are causing this change.

There are some who claim that interdependence is just such a post-modernization force and that the growth and spread of interdependence will lead to the decay of national borders and the emergence of regional and global "super-groups."[6] I disagree with this belief. The very word, the very notion of interdependence implies separate groups; interdependence is, by nature, a characteristic of a nationalized system.

There is no evidence that trade between two countries makes their borders dissolve. The fact that British people eat figs from Morocco and wear shirts from Singapore does not seem to lead to fusion or even a sympathy of Britain Moroccan and Singaporean peoples. In colonial days, high levels of trade existed between certain colonies and their colonial overlord. This did not lead to a merging of nations; on the contrary, it seemed to clarify the separation between the nations. Similarly, there is little evidence that countries which

rely on each other strategically will tend to meld into one entity. The United States and Great Britain have relied strategically on each other quite harmoniously for many decades and the countries show no signs of merging.

The basic point is this: interdependence, while certainly a characteristic of our age, does not greatly affect those forces which hold nations together. The glue of nationhood is shared culture as well as language, ethnicity and religion (in varying combinations). The group loyalty found in nations is an extremely powerful force. Although nations are relatively new in human history, the democrative lines upon which they are formed (cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious) run very, very deep in history. While modernization created a new international system - one of nations - it utilized ancient historical roots and divisions as the basis of the groupings of this system.

If a world community is to exist, some alternate basis of group loyalty must be found which can challenge or replace the deeply engrained patterns of group loyalty that now reign. It is very difficult to imagine what this alternate basis of group loyalty might be. By nature, any basis of group loyalty wide enough to include all people in the world must be considerably less compelling than the more distinct and immediate ties which do bind individuals in a single culture together.

VI. Culture

We have been concerned so far in this paper with two broad, intermingling themes: first, the process of modernization, that is, its effect on the basic political and economic systems or structures of societies, and second, the relation between these "external" systems or structures in societies and the lives of the individual members - the constraints, shaping, promoting, etc. of various aspects of their activity, of their potential. We have seen how modernization has transformed both the basic political units of the world (nationalism) and the ideals of political processes in these units (democratization); how modernization has brought political and economic systems from the question simply of order to the concerns of liberty, equality and affluence; and how modernization has changed the international system into an interdependent, globalized "society" of nations in which individuals' lives are highly affected by events outside of their nation's boundaries.

In addition to the political and economic systems, there exists another external realm of prime importance to the individual and the pursuit of potential - this is the realm of culture. In line with our investigation, we must ask two basic questions: how has culture (or cultural systems) been transformed by the process of modernization; or rather, is there a distinct difference between culture in traditional societies and culture in modern societies; and, what is the relation of this external system, culture, to the individual, to his life, to the exercise and fulfillment of his potential?

Such an analysis requires an initially stated, clear conception of what culture is. Unfortunately, no such conception or definition is available nor forthcoming. Psychologists, anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, etc. all have different notions of what culture is. Worse yet, the confusion surrounding the term "culture" does not stem solely from the fact that multiple approaches are taken in investigating it. This conceptual confusion may well

be endemic. That is to say, the fact that we have a term or a label "culture" does not mean that there is necessarily any recognizable, coherent body of phenomena to which we can point. As Wittgenstein warned, the use of a noun to describe what is by no means an object can lead us astray in the social sciences.

There is talk, often, of the possibility of "a general theory of culture." It is thought that such a theory would take its lofty place alongside other general theories such as "a theory of language," "a theory of justice," etc. I am doubtful, however, that any general theory of culture will arise. Culture is not a thing in the sense that language or even justice is. It is a higher order concept. Culture does not refer to some group of phenomena (as do "language" and "justice"). Rather, it refers to a group or groups of phenomena. This meta-group tends to consist of groups like language, religion, rituals, traditions, morals, values, etc. A general theory of culture therefore could not simply be another general theory; it would have to be a general theory of general theories. It is unclear what form such a meta-theory would take.

Nonetheless, cultural phenomena do exist. Bearing in mind that it is perhaps better to proceed faultily than not at all, two analyses of culture -- Gellners' and Sahlins'[2] - will be considered. Neither analysis explains "all of culture;" each undoubtedly neglects important aspects and components of culture. Both Gellner and Sahlins tend to focus on culture as it stands in relation to economic structures. Both tend to work toward explanations of the economics of culture or the culture of economics. This orientation is limiting, but as noted above, no complete theory is available. This orientation is useful in that economic changes are a central part of modernization.

Gellner sets culture in opposition to structure. Structure is a general word for the economic, political and social systems of a society.

> "The fact that for instance, property passes in the male line and that co-operating groups are determined by agnostic descent, are facts concerning the structure of a society; the fact that membership of a group is signified by wearing a certain kind of cloth, and that marital status is reflected in the manner of taking part in collective dances, is part of the culture of the society in question."

Culture, he says at this point, is "essentially the manner in which one communicates in the broadest sense" (in a society); it has the nature of an "extended language." Thus, cultural actions and events must always be understood by considering what they signify.

Sahlins speaks similarly about culture. In his words, the essence of culture is a society's "symbolic production." The symbolic production may take any number of forms - rituals, objects, myths, actions, etc. - and he bases his analysis of the difference between primitive vs. modern cultures on what he calls differences in the "loci" of the symbolic production of these societies. In his view, cultural order rests in and can be deduced from the societies' symbolic production.

Common to Gellner's and Sahlins' views is the conviction that while culture takes concrete forms (a certain type of dress, a certain ritual), the essence of cultural forms lies in what they signify. One could argue that in this sense culture is a system of beliefs, ideas, values or conceptions of reality. It seems, therefore, that culture has an ambiguous status as an external realm or system. Like political, economic and social structures, it is something external; it takes concrete form; it is greater than the individual; it is a system the individual takes part in and which orders the society in certain ways. Yet at the same time it is mentalistic; it exists at the level of thoughts, ideas and beliefs; it is symbolic in nature. It is thus an internal realm in a way that economic, political and social structures are not. Possibly, then, culture is a stepping stone between the strictly external realms (social, political, economic) that constrain or promote the individual and his potential and

the internal (psychological) realm which also determines a great part of an individual's life. Through this following analysis of culture, it is hoped that some connections between these often separated external and internal systems can be drawn or found.

Gellner argues that culture has a qualitatively different role and importance in modern societies than in primitive or traditional societies. His argument centers on the relationship between structure and culture. Primitive societies, he contends, have a highly developed structure (remember that structure here is a melange of political, economic and social networks). Individuals are ascribed roles (and, he notes, these roles are often defined in kinship terms) which determine and circumscribe their activities and relationships. Culture in such societies is also highly developed - the individual's role, his social position, is "richly symbolized in manner, conduct, ritual, dress and so forth." Yet, while culture is highly developed, it exists completely in parallel to the structure of the society. Culture is not indispensable, Gellner argues, because the societal structure sufficiently communicates the relationships and the roles of societal members. Culture serves only to reinforce structure.

In modern societies, Gellner argues, a very different relationship between structure and culture obtain. While structure certainly exists in modern societies and the individual is ascribed roles by these structures - e.g., family member (social structure), office worker (economic structure), citizen (political structure) - one's position in the structural networks is not, Gellner claims, "the essence of one's personality" in the way that it is in primitive societies. In modern societies, an individual is first and foremost a person and is not fully identified with his role(s). In modern societies, an individual can, Gellner says, change roles like overcoats. Specific organizations or groups (businesses, town, political group, bowling club, etc.) may ascribe particular roles but the point is that in modern society, men are fairly free to choose and

change their organization and groups. Structure exists but it is less determinate of an individual's identity and social position than it is in primitive societies.

This difference in the nature of structure between primitive and modern societies leads to a difference in the role of culture. We noted before that in highly structured societies (primitive societies) the structure itself is fully sufficient to provide coherency and communication in the society.

> "While relationships are fairly well-known (because the community is small and because the types of relationship are small in number), shared culture is not a precondition of effective communication. In the stable repetitive relationship of lord and peasant, it matters very little whether they both speak (in the literal sense) the same language. They have long ago sized each other up: each knows what the other wants, the tricks he may get up to, the defenses and countermeasures which, in the given situation, are available and so on." (p. 154 in Thought and Change)

Whereas, in modern societies, structure is not so all-determining. Where an individual can change roles and where the society is more fluid and flexible, structure is insufficient as the basis of communication between individuals:

> "In other words, (in a modern society) a very large proportion of one's relationships and encounters...are ephemeral, non-repetitive and optional. This has an important consequence: communication, the symbols, the language (in the literal or extended sense) that is employed, becomes crucial. The burden of comprehension is shifted from the context, to the communication itself: when interlocuters and contexts are all unfamiliar, the message itself must become intelligible - it is no longer understood, as was the case in traditional societies, before it was even articulated - and those who communicate must speak the same language, in some sense or other." (Ibid., p. 155)

And so, Gellner says, in modern societies culture - being "essentially the manner in which one communicates" - becomes of utmost importance. Culture does not just reinforce structure as it does in primitive societies, that is, it does not just underline and symbolize the roles, relationships and activities of the individual in the society, it replaces structure. Culture becomes the means by which coherency, intelligibility and order are achieved in the society.

In Gellner's view, then, modernization has changed the basic status of culture in society. He does not argue that culture is particularly more or less highly developed in modern as opposed to primitive societies; rather, he argues that the function of culture has changed. In modern societies, culture is no longer just an accessory to the structural networks underlying a society, it is instead the glue which unites individuals in a modern social order and renders these networks functional.

Marshall Sahlins has also studied the question of the difference between culture in primitive (or traditional) societies and culture in modern societies (he focuses on Western capitalist societies). The traditional argument regarding this difference is, Sahlins says, that culture in primitive societies is irrational, symbolic and mythic in nature, whereas culture in modern societies is fundamentally rational, concrete and utilitarian (incorporating the principle of material maximization). Sahlins argues that this classic distinction is wrong. Culture in both primitive and modern societies is, Sahlins contends (his arguments will be explicated below), a system of symbolic production: both primitive and modern cultures are symbolic orderings in their societies. The difference between primitive and modern culture lies, he says, in the loci of this symbolic ordering. In primitive societies, the dominant locus of symbolic production is in social (kinship) relations. In modern societies, the dominant locus of symbolic production is material production. (This will be explained more fully below). Like Gellner, Sahlins believes that there is a basic constancy in the nature of culture between primitive and modern societies and a basic inconstancy in the role or function of culture across these two types of societies.

Sahlins' thesis, as presented below, centers around two general points. Firstly, he contends that material production, a key aspect of Western capitalist

societies, is symbolically ordered. More specifically, the concept of value of produced objects is, Sahlins argues, based on symbolic properties or aspects of the objects rather than on the functional, concrete utility of the objects. Secondly, Sahlins holds that Western cultural order is embodied in the symbolic ordering of material production.

Sahlins begins by considering the nature of production in a society. From Marx he accepts the inseparable link between social relations and production. Production, Marx said, is a definite form of activity of individuals in a society, a definite form of expressing their life; it is a definite "mode of life" on their part. Production is not to be seen as an objective or absolute process: "It was Marx who taught that men never produce absolutely, that is, as biological beings in a universe of physical necessity. Men produce objects for given social subjects, in the course of reproducing subjects by social objects." (p. 168 in Culture and Practical Reason)

Production is not, Sahlins emphasizes, an "objective praxis;" it is culturally constituted. Production is not governed solely by exchange value (the "objective" measure of value); rather, it is significantly governed by the use-value of the produced objects. Use-values are culturally or socially determined; they are dependent upon cultural patterns and values - different cultures can put highly disparate use-values on identical objects produced by identical processes:

> "For, as Marx also taught, all production...remains the production of use-values. Without consumption the object does not complete itself as a product: a house left unoccupied is no house. Yet use-value cannot be understood on the natural level of 'needs' and 'wants' - precisely because men do not merely produce 'housing' or 'shelter': they produce dwellings of definite sorts, as a peasant's hut or a nobleman's castle. This determination of use-values, of a particular type of house as a particular type of home, represents a continuous process of social life in which men reciprocally define objects in terms of themselves and themselves in terms of objects." (Ibid., p. 169)

Production is something other than "a practical logic of material effectiveness." In producing objects, a society is organizing the material process of physical existence into a "meaningful process of social being" (Sahlins). Production, therefore, is a cultural intention.

Fundamental to Sahlins' general thesis is the process by which use-values are assigned to objects. Use-values, the "social meaning" of an object, comes not from the physical properties of the object itself but from the significance people in a culture give to these properties. Objects are assigned use-value by the symbolic properties that a culture assigns them:

> "It is by their correlations in a symbolic system that pants are produced for men and skirts for women, rather than by the nature of the object per se or its capacity to satisfy a material need - just as it is by the cultural values of men and women that the former normally undertake this production and the latter do not. No object, no thing, has being or movement in human society except by the significance men can give it." (Ibid., p. 170)

In short, while production is of material objects, of a material world, the value, the "meaning" of these objects, of this material world, is inherently a symbolic process - a process in which the culture renders significance upon the objects. Production, Sahlins says, is a functional moment of a cultural structure.

As examples of this process whereby objects are given value not simply according to their ability to satisfy basic needs but by their symbolic properties, Sahlins considers two cases - food and clothing. In explicating the symbolic ordering of food and clothing, Sahlins is demonstrating how in Western capitalist societies cultural order resides in and is embodied by material production.

In the first case, Sahlins examines the basis of distinctions in edibility among horses, dogs, pigs and cattle which prevail in Western societies. The marked, rigid distinctions that Western societies make among the edibility of

these four types of animals are not, he argues, based on rational-based or functional properties of the animals. Horses and dogs are nutritionally comparable to cattle and pigs and production of horses and dogs is not economically or practically unfeasible. There is, in fact, he points out, an enormous industry in the U.S. for raising horses as food for dogs.

The basis of our noticeable tendency to eat cattle and pigs rather than horses and dogs is related instead to certain crucial symbolic aspects of these various animals. Edibility, he says, is inversely related to humanity. Dogs and horses participate in American society in the capacity of subjects. We call them by personal names, we talk to them. We share our beds with dogs and allow them a place at meal-time. Horses are shown affection and raised as pets. Dogs and horses are far more "human" to us than pigs and cattle who have generally the status of objects. Dogs and horses are, therefore, deemed inedible while cattle and pigs are not. Material production and consumption of meat is, therefore, not ordered along functional lines. Certain symbolic properties of animals (their "humanness") determine the productive order. Cultural values (edibility is inversely related to humanity) reside in and order the productive structure of the society. Symbolic production (in this case, creating symbols out of animals) is located in material production (the production of domesticated animals).

The second case considered by Sahlins is a much broader one - the systems of clothing in Western societies. Again, the basic argument is that production and consumption of this range of objects is vastly underdetermined by or even disconnected from functional considerations (such as "keeping body warm," or "protecting skin from exposure to harsh elements"). Rather, the production and consumption of clothing is based upon a host of symbolic relationships that clothes may enter into. Sahlins quotes a study by Barthes which claims that at least 60 "foci of signification" exist in women's dress. Sahlins argues that

clothing in a Western society is a vast symbolic system: "a complex scheme of cultural categories and the relations between them, a veritable map of the cultural universe."

Some attempt is made to pursue a formalized grammar of clothing symbols. Sahlins talks of "elementary meaningful units" - shape of pockets, stiffness of cloth, width of collar, etc. This underlies, he says, a higher level "lexicon" of producible units - types of cloth (silk, wool, etc.), kinds of garment (shirts, blouses, etc.). From this, he begins to talk of the possibility of a proper syntax, rules of combination and " a formidable series of propositions."

While the prospect of such a grammar appears to me to be ill-fated, that clothes are highly symbolic in a society seems evident enough. Again, a range of material production is ordered by symbolic properties and cultural values. Culture resides in this material order. As Sahlins says, the clothing system becomes a vast scheme of communication: "a language of everyday life among those who may well have no prior intercourse of acquaintance." In saying this, in saying that as modern culture comes to reside in the level of material production, it serves as a means of communication between individuals who may well be unknown to each other. Sahlins has reached a remarkably similar conclusion as Gellner. Remember that Gellner argued that in modern societies, culture takes up the role played by structure in primitive societies of providing the means by which individuals can communicate in the wider society.

To review and conclude Sahlins' thesis, Western modern culture is symbolic in nature just as primitive culture is. This Western symbolic process, this Western "totemism," is, however, located in the realm of material production, whereas in primitive cultures, it centers upon social (kinship) relations. And the fact that Western societies have revolutionized material production, that

Western societies have domesticated nature, gives culture a wider and more powerful reign:

> "The bourgeois (Western) totemism, in other words, is potentially more elaborate than any wild (savage) variety, not that it has been liberated from a natural-material basis, but precisely because nature has been domesticated. 'Animals produce only themselves,' as Marx taught, 'while men reproduce the whole of nature.'
>
> Yet if it is not mere existence which men produce but a definite 'mode of life' on their part, it follows that this reproduction of the whole of nature constitutes an objectification of the whole of culture. By the systemic arrangement of meaningful differences (symbolic properties) assigned the concrete, the cultural order is realized also as an order of goods. The goods stand as an object code for the signification and valuation of persons and occasions, functions and situations. Operating on a specific logic of correspondence between material and social contrasts, production is thus the reproduction of the culture in a system of objects." (Ibid., p. 178)

Sahlins' theory of culture, while provocative, has both limitations and flaws. The major problem with Sahlins' analysis is that it appears not to take account of many important aspects of culture. While material production is unquestionably a vital part of modern societies, so are opinions, values, traditions, arts, sports, rituals, literacy, etc. It is hard to accept what seems to be Sahlins' contention that the whole of cultural order is contained in the differences between McDonald's and Burger King, pants and skirts, dogs and cows, etc.

Not only is there much more to culture than the material order but Sahlins has yet to demonstrate convincingly that material order is all that important in culture. His examples of meat-eating patterns and clothing are not sufficient to carry his case. Beside other obviously important cultural aspects (religion, art, etc.), his examples seem almost trivial.

It can also be argued that Sahlins underplays functionality in the material order to an unrealistic degree. In terms of meat produced vs. food consumed, cows and pigs are likely to make better commercial animals than dogs. People do choose cars with some idea of how much gas they consume, how many people

they hold, are they good for long trips. Many or most consumer decisions could arguably seem to have some functional component. When people want something to wash their clothes with, they tend to buy washing machines, not toasters.

Furthermore, it can be argued that Sahlins overplays the significance of differentiations that do exist between products. The fact that my orange shirt may in some way signify luxury and my blue shirt practicality does not necessarily mean that every time I reach into the closet and choose one versus the other I am intent on symbolizing one value versus the other. I may be choosing one because it is less dirty than the other. Sahlins has not shown that people actually participate to a high degree in the symbolic structures that he and other structuralists read into material goods. Any claim that such participation is tacit and unavoidable is largely a dodge.

At best then, Sahlins' analysis of culture is limited to those aspects of culture directly connected with the economic system. In no way does his analysis provide a general account of culture. At worst, it is an exaggerated picture of certain economic features of a modern capitalist system. My own view of the credibility of Sahlins' theory lies somewhere in between these two points. It is in any case an interesting perspective and it is useful to consider some of its implications.

Speaking most broadly, two ideas emerge from the two above analyses (Gellner's and Sahlins') of culture. The first idea is that culture plays a more central or more vital role in modern societies than it does in primitive societies. Whereas in primitive societies culture exists as an adjunct to the political, economic and social structures which determine the modes of life in the society; in modern societies culture itself becomes a primary determinant of order and made of these structures. The second idea is that while in modern societies culture is an <u>external</u> realm, in some ways like the political

and economic realms, it differs from them in that it is symbolic in nature. It is a symbolic system which underlies and orders the concrete, material systems of modern societies. In modern societies, culture has been liberated from its former subservient position to structure and its function has become diffusely all-encompassing: in modern societies, structure (political, economic, social) is the ground we walk on, culture is the air we breath.

What then of culture and human potential in modern societies? Throughout this paper, we have been examining the relation of external realms - domestic political and economic systems, the international political system - to potential. We have seen how external systems can constrain or promote an individual's activities, an individual's pursuit of potential in many domains - the exercise of liberties, participation in the selection of leaders, the pursuit of material goods or affluence, the pursuit of equality, the formation or maintenance of social order, etc., etc. Implicit in this examination of these external systems is the notion that the exercise and realization of potential is also greatly controlled by internal systems, by the internal realm of the human mind: the internal systems of cognition, perception, motivation, emotion, etc. It is culture which connects the external and internal realms. Culture is an external system which orders and breathes meaning into the concrete structures overlaying a modern society. Yet culture is also an internal system which ties individual thought into a coherent societal language allowing individuals to interact and comprehend one another and to participate in the external structures. Culture mediates the internal and external systems that govern human potential.

To understand "life in the modern world," we must step back at this point and consider the conjunctive effect of the basic transformations in economics and in culture that underlie the process of modernization.

Transformation one (economic): Man has industrialized. Man has domesticated nature. Man has expanded his material production exponentially so that

he now lives in a material world of his own creation.

> "In the twentieth century the essence of man is not that he is a rational, or a political, or a sinful, or a thinking animal but that he is an industrial animal. It is not his moral or intellectual or social or aesthetic etc., etc., attributes which make man what he is; his essence resides in his capacity to contribute to, and to profit from, industrial society."3

Transformation two (cultural): Culture has an expanded function in the modern world. Culture, symbolic production, is no longer confined to social relations. Culture has emerged from the delimited confines of structure and now is the ordering principle of structure itself. The modern industrialized economic realm is culturally ordered. Economic value is culturally determined. Culture is, as always, a symbolic process, or symbolic system. The modern industrialized economic systems are therefore essentially symbolic orders, symbolic systems.

The conjunction of these two transformations is this: in the modern world, in modern societies, man creates a material world and man finds meaning in this world through symbolic ordering and symbolic properties. Man the producer and man the symbol-maker converge in their ultimate fruition.

The essential point is that man's new world, the material world that he has produced, is symbolically ordered, that it is a symbolic system. In modernizing, man has not just changed the shapes and forms of his world (by industrializing), he has changed the basic nature of his world - it is now largely symbolic.

Man's symbolic function has exploded dramatically in modernization. Prior to modernization, we lived in a world where objects were largely functional "in meaning" (a hut was shelter, a cloth was clothing, a dead animal was food), and symbols were confined to a relatively specific domain and role (kinship relations - differentiation of kinship structures). In the modern world, however, the many objects around us are no longer primarily functional in meaning. A shirt symbolizes status, wealth, seductiveness, etc., a house symbolizes class

status, social attitudes, etc. While objects do still perform functions, the only way to differentiate between the highly varied objects of a similar basic function is by their symbolic attributes. An almost infinite range and variety of clothes function to keep one warm and protect the skin. The only way to distinguish between them, that is, the "meaningful differences" between them, are related not to differences in function but to differences in what they signify or symbolize. Symbolization in modern societies has broken its earlier bounds; symbolization is the ordering method of material production and so symbolization penetrates every aspect of our industrialized life.

Psychologists have of course recognized the "symbolic function" as an essential component of the human mind. They have traced its development in children, following the complex but somewhat regular evolution of children's symbolic skills. In considering the "symbolic function," however, psychologists have generally confined their inquiry to what might be called "pure symbols." By "pure symbols," it is meant either the non-object symbols such as language, mathematics, and codes or the artistic symbols such as painting, sculpture, music, etc. They have not considered the almost infinite realm of symbols around us - shirts, cars, food, houses, toothpaste brands, etc. These objects, while functional in at least some way, find meaning in modern society through their symbolic attributes - we might call them "impure symbols."

Whether or not it is feasible (as Sahlins suggests) to attempt to develop some conception of mediums for these impure symbols (e.g., the "clothing medium," etc. as discussed by Sahlins) the fact remains that to take part in a modernized society, an individual's symbolic function must be utilized in a way unknown in breadth, amount, and possibly sophistication to individuals in non-modernized societies. The transition in economic and cultural structures of the modern world may also have led to a transition in the mental structures necessary to take part in it.

VII. Summary and Conclusions - Modernism and Beyond

Modernization is bringing, and in some areas of the world has brought, fundamental changes to the political, economic and cultural systems of the many societies populating the planet. All of the "external" systems that guide, promote and constrain human potential have been or are in the process of being transformed. Common to the transformations of these diverse systems is a basic notion of a radical expansion of human potential. As the transformations discussed in this paper (nationalism, democratization, political and economic systems, the international political system, culture) are summarized below, the basic element of the expansion of human potential in each transformation will be emphasized. From this summary, the general conception of the potential of humans that underlies the pursuit and achievement of modernization can be distilled. And to conclude, some consideration will be given to questions of "what lies beyond modernism?" and "what expansion of human potential beyond the achievement of modernization is forseeable or conceivable?"

Nationalism transformed the nature and form of political organization in the world. Nationalism brought the notion that a political grouping should be the expression of a "General Will," that political units in the world should be the products of the exercise of collective self-determination of individuals united by some form of shared culture. Inherent in nationalism is a dynamic, expanded view of human potential: nationalism embodies an active form of group membership, nations (unlike previous, traditional political units) are the collective expression of individual self-determination.

Democratization, which modernization has brought as a reality to some parts of the world and an ideal to most parts, also hinges upon a transformed conception of human potential. Fundamental to the principle of democracy (to the idea that a government should be of, for and by the people) is the revolutionary

notion that individuals can and should control their own destiny, that individuals should lead themselves rather than be led by leaders unchosen and apart from the bulk of the members of a society. The idea that the political process should be directed and controlled by the summated wishes of individuals represents an extremely elevated (relative to pre-modern times) value on the individual and his capacities.

Our examination of political and economic systems revealed that in line with the process of modernization is the shift from the accomplishment of a consensual social and political order to the pursuit of the goals of liberty, equality and affluence. Nations which have largely modernized are preoccupied with the latter goals, nations attempting to modernize need to achieve the former goal (consensual social and political order) to begin to pursue the latter goals, yet are under pressure to accomplish all the goals at once. The modern goals of society-wide liberty, equality and affluence all involve dramatic advancements of human potential. Liberty allows the individual manifold rights to exercise his capacities and powers: to express his beliefs, thoughts and opinions, to assemble, to practice religion freely, to travel, etc., etc.

Equality, in its different forms (equality of citizenship, opportunity, and status) guarantees the individual some minimum footing in his life. Equality (in all its forms) as a societal goal embodies the idea that the individual has some intrinsic worth which is a given in the society and that the society will work to maintain this value. This is in contrast to societies (non-modern) which do not subscribe to any such notion of equality and allow individuals to expire or to sink to a level of inhuman existence with no support or aid from the society.

Affluence, the economic goal of modern societies, unquestionably revolves around a belief in the revolutionary expansion of human potential. The

satisfaction of humans' basic needs and the ability to produce a material world far beyond the basic needs of society's members promises to allow all individuals to pursue far more than basic survival. In pre-modernized societies, leisure time, luxury goods, convenience items, wide material choices were all accessible only to a very limited strata of society. Industrialization brings them to a majority of individuals in a society well-industrialized and in so doing, vastly expands the realm of individuals' possibilities.

The international political system has, of course, also been transformed by modernization. Political units in the world no longer interact like billiard balls; that is, the barrier between domestic and international events and concerns has substantially dissolved. Modernization with its economic, technological, intellectual, political (etc.) transformations has globalized the international political system and has given rise to considerable, and increasing, interdependence among nations. While primitive in nature, and anarchic in practice, some sense of an international society has come to exist - there is some agreement on certain basic international issues or at least some willingness of nations to discuss and to work toward agreement. Individuals in a society are, then, no longer screened off from the world outside. Every individual's potential is both limited and ameliorated by the swirl of events taking place beyond the borders of his political unit. Potential is not only no longer simply a personal affair, is no longer just a societal matter - the international realm now has a considerable direct bearing on every individual's life.

Finally, modernization transforms culture. In modern societies, cultural systems are not secondary to and bounded by social, political and economic structures; rather, culture is liberated from and, in some ways, prior to or essential to the ordering of these other external structures. Culture replaces these structures as the primary means by which a society is held together. This expansion or elevation of the function of culture means that the symbolic process

expands its bounds and its function in human life. Human potential as it is in part realized through symbolic forms and symbolic production is resultingly enlarged.

Implicit in all these above-mentioned systemic transformations that are brought about by and in fact largely make up modernization is the radical expansion of human potential. It is tempting, in fact, to argue that the essence of modernization is the expansion of human potential. Whether such an argument is tenable or not is open to question. The fact remains, however, that modernism seems to embody the notion that it is the path or the means toward "ultimate" human potential. Taken collectively, the goals of modernism, if achieved, provide what would appear to be an ideal environment for the realization of human potential. If a society achieved all the goals of modernism, its members would be: 1) politically self-determining as a group (nationalism) and as individuals (democratization); 2) part of a consensual social and political order which would provide them with freedom to think, believe, express, do, etc. what they chose and would provide them with equality of some sort (formal, substantive, etc.); 3) part of an economic system which would not just supply all their basic needs but an almost endless range of goods and luxuries, leisure time, choice in work and in consumption, etc.; 4) part of a highly developed, far-reaching cultural order which fleshes out the economic or material systems through a complex network of symbolic orders and attributes. It is hard to imagine what more could be done by a society to promote the potential of its members. Modernism seems to provide a kind of ultimate answer to the question of human potential. And, in fact, in the world today, all societies seem to have accepted some version of this answer and strive toward it doggedly. The basic tenets of modernism and its conception of what environment is best for the realization of human potential have been accepted so widely and so thoroughly that they have become the air we breathe. The questioning debates that do exist all over the world

in societies concerned with their future center not on the basic road itself but on the best way to move along it.

There exists in fact in the world a certain sense that the modern age is the final stage of man. It is not just that the future is unimaginable, for futures are often that way, it is that the very idea of a future seems inconceivable. It is an age that calls itself modern with the implicit notion that nothing beyond it can exist. It is an appellation that insists on a sort of atemporality - for an age that has seen at least 150 years pass. It is an age of endings - the end of ideology, the end of art, the end of faith, the end of all we once knew. Apocalyptic visions pervade our spirit. Nuclear destruction, environmental disaster, resource depletion serve as fuel for fantasies and scenarios of the biggest end of all - the end of the world.

There is a sense of stagnation in the West. The countries which led the world into the modern age seem to be foundering on the task of "going beyond." No new ideas are put forward, or if they are, they are not believed in. What lies beyond affluence, equality, freedom and democracy? What lies beyond these goals of modernization? What is the potential of potential? The response to these very fundamental questions is only a deafening scuffle as the West, currently somewhat economically threatened by certain world events and trends, digs in and clamors for self-preservation. The non-Western world struggles furiously to enter this final stage while the Western world struggles to remain there.

This sense of finality surrounding modernism is disturbing and begs explanation. Some explanation can be found in the fact that a number of the transformations which make up the modernization process quite plainly appear to be last steps in whatever realm of human behavior they concern. Let us consider these specifically.

First, there is the nature of war. War has been with man for a long time and has undergone continual evolution. In the modern age, destructive capacity has grown exponentially to the point where the capacity to destroy most human beings in a very short time exists. Thus, there is the sense that war has undergone its final evolution, that war is in its final stage. Nothing beyond complete destruction is readily imaginable.

Second, there is the nature of explanation that man is capable of with regard to himself and the world around him. Rational thought has been with man for a very long time. In the modern age, however, a type of explanation, a type of understanding, has come to the fore - scientificism. Scientific explanations are now available for much of the physical phenomena that surround man. And man is at work at providing scientific explanations of himself (molecular biology, neurophysiology, behavioral biology, etc.). Scientism is an ultimate form of explanation. Scientific explanations claim to be fundamental. As man unravels the world and himself with his scientific skills, the prevailing belief is that this is a primary form of explanation - that, in fact, man has reached the ultimate, final stage of understanding his world and himself.

Third, there does appear to be an exhaustion of political ideas. All of the political systems of today are based upon political ideas and theories of the previous two centuries. No new alternatives to the two dominant systems in the modernized world -liberal capitalism and Communism - are budding. Both these dominant systems claim to answer the question of how to attain the goals of liberty, equality and affluence. No further goals have clearly been formulated, no new political ideas have arisen in response.

Fourth, man's relation to nature seems to have reached its final stage. For his entire history, man has struggled with nature,gradually gaining a certain control over it. Industrialization brought to a rapid conclusion this ancient struggle. Industrial man has domesticated nature and,as Sahlins says, reproduces

nature in material forms. Man has not only mastered nature, he has begun to destroy it. In mastering nature, man has lost his ancient relation to the world; he has lost his context. In dissipating and even destroying nature, man has developed the capacity to destroy his context, his basis of existence. Man, then, has entered into his final stage with nature.

Fifth, Western man has, since the time of the Greeks, invested his ideals in the development of what might be called "high culture" - the arts, scholarship, philosophy. Modernization promised to unleash an explosion of high culture; the spread of literacy and leisure time promised to give high culture a vigor and form unprecedented in history. Instead, the widespread, vast atrocities committed in the 20th century by many Western nations have given lie to the idea that because of their high culture, their humanities, Western peoples would be incapable of acting inhumanely on a wide scale. The notion that the humanities humanize was destroyed when particularly highly cultured societies such as Germany engaged in massive, unthinkable acts of inhumanity. This has caused the West to doubt fundamentally its belief in its high culture, in its humanities. The whole sense of an evolving, progressing culture has been seriously sapped of credibility. In the face of their inability to humanize, the humanities have come to be seen less as tools, methods and results and more as diversions, entertainment and obscurantism. Culture (in the sense of high culture) seems to be in a final stage - a stage of collapse, or, as Steines[1] says, the stage of "post-culture."

Sixth, a fundamental aspect of history has been the basic separateness of the various civilizations on the globe and their slow but definite attempts to make contact. This has been the process of spreading the notion of an international society, in at least some very simple form,to more and more parts of the world. The modern age dramatically stepped up this process. Technological

advances have made travel, communication and comprehension radically easier across the globe. The international system has globalized - all the world is nationalized, all the nations (with occasional exceptions) take part in the system. Again, another basic trend in human history has wildly accelerated and reached a seeming limit - it is hard to reach beyond globalism.

Seventh, the very nature of change itself has reached a sort of final stage. Implicit in history has been the sense of continual and perhaps somewhat accelerating change. Modernization has been a process of exponentially increasing change. The rate of change has increased so drastically that there is a certain feeling now that "change can't keep changing the way it has been." That is to say, change itself has entered a final or ultimate stage of evolution.

The seeming finality of modernism has its roots, therefore, in the fact that in a host of realms (war, inquiry, politics, economics, culture, internationalism, and change) modernization has brought man to a sudden and apparent end of a long evolution. Both the remarkable, unprecedented benefits and the somber sense of finality result from the revolutionary, all-encompassing nature of modernization. Perhaps it is unreasonable to wish to have the one without the other.

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